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Abstract
Traditional computer networks require manual configuration of potentially hundreds of forwarding de-
vices. To ease this configuration burden, software-defined networking (SDN) provides centralized, program-
matic control of switch data planes in the form of applications, or control modules. This modular design
simplifies development, and allows network operators to leverage a potentially vast library of open source
SDN applications.
However, configuring an SDN is still prone to misconfigurations, software bugs, and unexpected behavior.
An operator must reason about the configuration on at least three planes in the network: the management
plane, the control plane, and the data plane. At the control plane, an operator must ensure the applications
driving the network are correct, or free of software bugs. At the management plane, an operator must
determine how to compose together multiple applications to create a coherent forwarding behavior. This
requires reasoning about inter-application interactions and how to resolve conflicts between them. Finally,
she must understand the execution of the applications on top of the controller, and how any bugs in the
controller’s implementation may introduce unexpected behavior.
This thesis explores techniques in verification and synthesis to ease the burden of configuring of an SDN
and provide techniques to automatically search for unpredictable behavior. We present three primitives
to search program behavior at the management plane, control plane, and data plane, without the need to
understand the implementation details of the controller or applications. Specifically, we design primitives
for orchestration, fast-forwarding, and autocorrect.
First, to tackle the problem of SDN application correctness, we introduce a fast-forwarding primitive
to verify and explore future behaviors of a control plane application. Unlike traditional approaches to
software verification, this primitive faithfully models time — an important source of complexity in control
programs. We implement this idea in a model checker called DeLorean, and develop techniques to speed
up the exploration of control programs. As a result, DeLorean can explore the future behavior of programs
faster than they occur.
Next, to reduce the complexity of composing together multiple, independent applications, we provide an
orchestration primitive. This technique automatically discovers dependencies between applications and can
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suggest conflict-free composition plans to operators. With this primitive, we adopt a relational representation
of the network and use a standard PostgreSQL database to develop a controller called Ravel. In addition to
logic-based reasoning of inter-application dependencies, Ravel enables ad-hoc creation of new programming
abstractions. Furthermore, Ravel can act as a runtime on which different abstractions or controllers can
execute using translations to Ravel’s schema.
Finally, to reduce the operator’s burden of understanding the low-level implementation details of an ap-
plication or controller, we introduce an autocorrection primitive with NEAt (Network Error Autocorrection).
NEAt builds on synthesis techniques to prevent applications or a controller from installing policy-violating
updates, ensuring the behavior of the network is correct and predictable at the data plane. NEAt allows
backward-compatibility with existing SDN deployments and acts as a transparent layer between the network
and controller, enforcing correctness by repairing updates that violate the network policy.
We test our primitives on real-world datasets and applications. With DeLorean and NEAt, we find bugs
in real configurations running on deployed systems.
iii
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Ensuring a computer network reliably transfers data from a source to a destination is a complex pro-
cess. Networks may consist of hundreds or thousands of forwarding devices, which a network operator must
individually configure. A modern network can be divided into three planes of functionality: the manage-
ment plane, the control plane, and the data plane. To monitor the state and performance of the routers
and switches on a network, as well as define high-level policy, an operator can use management plane ser-
vices and protocols, such as SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol). To configure the protocols
that discover paths connecting endpoints on the network, an operator configures the control plane of the
forwarding devices that run routing protocols such as OSPF (Open Shortest Path First). These protocols
generate forwarding rules in the data plane, which provides fast packet forwarding through the network.
Although routing protocols provide reliable routing even in the face of link failures, a network operator must
configure hundreds or thousands of parameters for these protocols through command-line interfaces (CLIs)
or application programmer interfaces (APIs).
In a traditional network, the control plane and data plane are tightly coupled. Both functional compo-
nents reside on a forwarding device, and therefore an operator must individually configure each device. In
doing so, the operator must translate high-level policies into low-level commands and parameters. As the
size of enterprise networks increase, so does the complexity of configuring and maintaining a network. Worse
yet, networks require constant human intervention and maintenance to remain operational. The network
may grow, requiring the addition of new router or switches, and devices may fail or need upgrading. One
recent study found that operators make changes to their network configuration at least once per day [63].
These updates, even those that fix a bug, can be problematic from an operator’s perspective. In the same
study, 89% of operators were never certain a change would be bug-free, and 82% were concerned the change
would affect existing functionality unrelated to the change.
In recent years, a new paradigm called software-defined networking (SDN) has emerged, separating the
control plane and data plane. With SDN, a centralized controller acts as the control plane, while switches
simply forward packets. The controller sends updates to the switches to install or remove forwarding rules
from their data plane, and switches send events to the controller notifying it of a new connection, the arrival
1
Figure 1.1: SDN architecture
of certain packets, or the state of flow counters. As a result of this decoupling of the control and data
planes, the data plane adopts a unified interface (e.g., OpenFlow) and the forwarding behavior of switches is
abstracted into a simple match-action model. Furthermore, the introduction of a centralized controller offers
a global view and control of the network. Controllers [14] can expose APIs, as well as high-level languages
and novel abstractions [45, 78, 87, 63, 81], which developers can leverage for programmatic control of the
network. Thousands of lines of configurations can be replaced with a few hundreds of lines of Python or Java
running on an SDN controller. This modular design simplifies development, and allows network operators
to leverage a potentially vast library of open source applications.
Nevertheless, configuring and managing the applications — or control modules — driving an SDN is
inherently difficult. Like traditional networks, SDNs are prone to misconfigurations, software bugs, and
unexpected behaviors. At the control plane, an operator must ensure the applications are correct, or free of
software bugs. These applications can be complex — they may depend on time, requiring an operator to
reason about how the application will respond not only to events, but also the time at which the events occur.
At the management plane, with multiple applications collectively controlling the network, the operator must
reason about their interactions and how to resolve conflicts between them. In many cases, this requires
the operator to understand each application at the implementation level. Finally, to prevent unexpected
behavior at the data plane, an operator must understand the execution model of the controller — the
system on which the applications run — and how each application’s output is processed and delivered to the
switches. Failure to correctly reason about any of these three dimensions can lead to unpredictable behavior,
compromising the safety, security, and efficiency of the network. This configuration management nightmare,
however, is not limited to enterprise networks. With the proliferation of Internet-enabled devices for homes
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(e.g., thermostats, lights, cameras), even home networks and home automation systems can be difficult to
manage. Unintended behaviors in this context can compromise privacy and increase cost (e.g., in the case
of an improperly configured thermostat).
Recent work toward solving this challenge has focused on three approaches: domain-specific languages,
verification, and synthesis. High-level, domain-specific languages [45, 78, 63] simplify the development of
new SDN applications, but require porting existing functionality into the new language. Further, because of
the level of abstraction of these languages, the resulting low-level behavior of the program may not be fully
understood by the programmer. Composing or integrating together multiple applications in these languages
is also not a simple task. Pyretic [78] and other frameworks [56, 76, 93] targeting this integration problem
can require an operator to coordinate the composition at a low level. As a result, a network operator must
take on the role of a developer and understand the details of the implementation to determine how the
applications will interact and how to resolve conflicts between them.
Orthogonal to these language-based approaches is verification of existing or new configurations. For
SDNs, this can target the correctness of the control plane [27, 30] or the data plane [61, 59, 58, 34]. Traditional
model checkers [46, 79, 62] and those that verify control plane applications [27], however, abstract away time
in their exploration of the application’s behavior. As a result, for SDN and other control programs that
depend intimately on time, these approaches can miss potential behavior or explore behavior that may
never occur in practice. Prior work [19, 24] that addresses this problem requires modeling the applications
as automata. The modeling process may introduce bugs if the process is manual and the model does
not faithfully capture the behavior of the program. The model may also become inconsistent with the
implementation during development [79], and the tool will fail to catch any bugs introduced after the model
is constructed.
In place of verifying old or new configurations, another technique is synthesis. Work in this space [90,
104, 91, 89] automatically configures the network from examples or partial specifications. The resulting
configuration obeys the correctness properties derived from the specification. However, the performance of
these tools can be too slow for real-time applications, for example, to act as a transparent layer repairing
buggy updates from applications. Additionally, specifying program behavior using examples may be tedious
and more time consuming than implementing the application in a lower-level language.
Although there is no silver bullet to this challenge, a common trend in SDN research is to move network
management into software, thus becoming a software development task. Software testing tools, such as
verification and synthesis, can then be more easily applied to network configurations. However, the abstrac-
tions provided by these SDN software frameworks and domain-specific languages have an inherent trade-off
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between the level of control and level of abstraction. Too high-level of an abstraction and an operator or
developer maybe not be able to fully express the desired functionality and the system may hide important
technical details. With too low-level of an abstraction, the operator may be burned with too many technical
details, resulting in buggy or undesirable network behavior. Building off the insight that network manage-
ment is moving toward a software engineering approach, this thesis aims to leverage principles from formal
methods to simplify SDN management for network operators by introducing primitives to make the task of
managing this software more predictable.
1.1 Terminology
In this thesis, we define the task of configuring an SDN as the process of implementing a specific behavior
in the network. This behavior is often the composition of multiple, high-level demands (e.g., industry
standards or regulatory requirements). For example, this might include how paths are rerouted when links
fail, how traffic is balanced across a set of links, or how clients connecting to a web server are balanced across
a set of web server replicas. This behavior is collectively realized over a set of forwarding devices that are
centrally controlled by a controller. The controller exposes an API to programmatically modify the state of
these devices.
Applications, or control modules, build on this API to implement a specific feature (e.g., load balancing).
An application may have inputs, such as an IP whitelist or blacklist in the case of a firewall application.
Applications are event-driven and typically structured as a collection of event handlers. These event handlers
execute in response to events occurring in the system, such as the arrival of a packet at the controller. An
event handler can set a timer to fire at a point in the future, which may trigger the execution of another
event handler. Additionally, a specific time of day can trigger an event handler to execute.
To run multiple applications simultaneously, one must define a composition plan that specifies the or-
dering of application execution or how to resolve conflicts between applications. One such composition
plan is the assignment of priorities to applications, such that the highest-priority application executes last
in response to an event. For example, suppose a load balancer and firewall are composed together, and
the firewall is assigned the highest priority. If the load balancer installs a path that violates the firewall’s
blacklist, the firewall will override this update before it is installed in the switch.
To modify the state of the forwarding devices, applications generate updates that the controller sends
to the devices. An update may add, remove, or modify a forwarding rule in a device. Although devices
also send updates to the controller to inform it of the state of links or flow counters, only updates from the
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controller can modify forwarding rules.
Therefore, the configuration process for an operator consists of at least three tasks: i) implementing or
collecting a set of applications that will control the network; ii) determining the inputs for these applications
based on the specific demands, policies, and topology of the network; and iii) defining a composition plan
for the applications.
1.2 Research Questions
The main question that drives this thesis is how can we make control of software-defined networks more
predictable without requiring an operator to understand the implementation details of different layers in the
SDN stack? Although understanding the implementation details of an application may burden a network
operator, she must have some knowledge of an application’s behavior and how it interacts with the other
applications simultaneously controlling the network. However, understanding how these applications behave
— independently and collectively — in response to all events is a difficult task. This task becomes even
more challenging as additional applications are added to the network configuration.
In answering this question, this work develops three new primitives to automatically explore and search
program behavior for unexpected behavior: fast-forwarding, orchestration, autocorrection. These primitives
build on exploration of program behavior, in the form of verification and synthesis. The aim of these
primitives is to aid the operator in configuring the network and provide confidence that the configuration
produces the intended behavior at each layer: the management plane, the control plane, and the data plane.
With orchestration [99, 98], an operator can compose together multiple applications — written at different
levels of abstraction — without the need to specify a low-level composition policy. Orchestration searches
for and synthesizes a policy that avoids conflicts between the operations within each application, ensuring
applications are configured correctly in the management plane. With fast-forwarding [30, 29], the operator
can verify and interactively inspect the future behaviors of the applications, ensuring the application is correct
in the control plane. Should bugs exist in the controller, or intricacies of its implementation require non-
intuitive changes to an application, autocorrection [105] ensures the applications and controller produce the
correct data plane rules. An operator can define correctness properties and run unmodified SDN application,
with the confidence that updates violating these properties will be repaired automatically.
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1.2.1 Fast-Forwarding
Predictable and bug-free behavior in an SDN needs a correctly implemented SDN application. As such, in
the first part of this thesis, we develop a fast-forwarding primitive for home automation (HA) and software-
defined networking (SDN) programs that builds on software verification. HA and SDN programs depends
intimately on time, both on absolute time (i.e., time of day) and relative time (i.e., the elapsed time between
two or more events). In enterprise networks, behavior can depend on absolute time as operators define
different actions for peak load time, data usage policies over a fixed period (e.g., monthly usage quotas),
or for billing and accounting. Behavior can also depend on relative time, for example, for DHCP leases or
cache expiry. Similarly, automated homes may have different policies for day vs. night, or timers to turn on
lights for certain periods after detecting motion.
To realize this primitive, we design a tool called DeLorean, which uses timed automata (TA) [16] to
explore program behavior of real HA and SDN programs. Unlike previous TA-based model checkers [19, 24],
DeLorean does not require a model of the code. Fast-forwarding entails a hard performance constraint as
such a tool must explore all possible future behaviors before they can occur in real time. To this end, we
introduce new techniques to speed up exploration and find DeLorean can fast-forward HA programs up to
36K times faster than real-time.
This work is inspired by the following questions:
• How can we scalably examine the behavior of a control plane application by checking all possible events
occurring at all possible times?
• How can we perform this exploration without first deriving an automaton from the program?
• What types of control programs benefit most from checking temporal correctness properties?
• What types of bugs are not easily uncovered by traditional verification tools that do not maintain
temporal consistency?
1.2.2 Orchestration
Although SDN simplifies the management of networks by providing a large library of existing applica-
tions, composing together and configuring these applications is not a simple task. To correctly predict the
interaction of and conflicts between the applications, an operator may need to understand each application
at an implementation level. Orchestration automates this search for dependencies and conflicts, and builds
on the idea that network control fundamentally revolves around data representation. We design a controller,
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Ravel, that adopts a relational representation of the network, where the network topology, forwarding, and
control applications are represented as SQL tables, views, and triggers.
While this is not the first work to leverage a SQL-like syntax for SDN applications, it is the first SDN
controller built entirely on top of a standard (PostgreSQL [12]) database. Furthermore, the design of Ravel
enables building on principles from the database community to solve challenging SDN problems, such as
the composition and configuration of multiple applications. For example, this problem can be formulated
as a data integration problem [68, 35] of merging data sources into an integrated whole, where network
management tasks represent the individual sources, and the data plane as the integrated whole.
The research questions associated with this approach are presented below.
• With constantly changing network demands, what are the “right” programming abstractions for net-
work applications? Can a relational representation of the network enable easier design of new abstrac-
tions and composition across them?
• Can this representation allow for easier and automated composition of multiple SDN applications?
1.2.3 Autocorrection
To aid in the management of existing network configurations and SDN applications, the final part of this
thesis proposes an autocorrection primitive. To design such a primitive, we explore a real-time application
of synthesis through the design of a tool called NEAt (Network Error Autocorrection). NEAt prevents un-
modified SDN applications from installing updates that might violate an operator’s intended policy. Rather
than blocking these updates, as in the case of real-time verification tools, NEAt attempts to repair violations
introduced by the update. NEAt automatically searches for changes to the update, such that the resulting
configuration obeys the correctness properties defined by the network operator.
The main research questions for this primitive are:
• How can we enforce and repair correctness on-the-fly without modifications to control programs?
• How can we constrain divergence between application state and network state in the face of repairs?
1.3 Thesis Statement
Our thesis is the following:
Configuring an SDN requires reasoning about a large space of program behaviors. An operator must
consider the implementations of the applications controlling the network, their interactions with other ap-
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plications, and the controller on which it runs, among other complexities. Automatic search techniques can
help an operator efficiently reason about this large space of behaviors.
1.4 Key Contributions
The key contributions of this thesis are three new primitives enable automatically searching SDN configu-
rations for unexpected behavior. Using fast-forwarding, orchestration, and autocorrection, network operators
can examine how the configuration executes at the management plane, control plane, and data plane. In
developing these primitives, this thesis makes the following concrete contributions:
• The first TA-based model checker that operates on real code. Building on real-time systems
verification and the theory of timed automata, we build DeLorean, which explores future behaviors of
real HA and SDN programs. Unlike previous TA-based techniques [19, 24], this is the first to verify
real programs, rather than a model of the code. Furthermore, DeLorean is the first application of TAs
as a technique to explore future program behaviors. DeLorean also achieves better coverage of source
code and program states than existing model checkers that maintain temporal consistency [103].
• Novel optimizations for TA-based exploration of program behavior. Similar to traditional
model checkers [79], DeLorean faces the state space explosion problem, in which programs can generate
an intractable number of programs states to explore. Worse yet, TAs use virtual clocks (VCs) defined
by the constraints on variables storing time. These VCs define a finite number of regions, or equivalence
classes, and an exploration requires examining every reachable program state in every reachable time
region. To scalably explore this larger state space, this work uses three optimizations: predicting
successor states, reducing the number of VCs, and identifying and exploring independent control loops
in the program.
• An SDN controller built on a standard database. To automatically configure and compose
together multiple applications, we propose a design for a new SDN controller called Ravel that is built
on top of a standard PostgreSQL [12] database. In addition to the ability to leverage research from the
database community, Ravel presents the network to the operator as a collection of SQL tables. Not
only is SQL-broadly familiar and a time-tested language for manipulating data, it additionally allows
for easy creation of new abstractions in the form of SQL views and triggers.
• A formulation of the application composition problem as a data integration problem.
An SDN controller built on top of a standard database enables an investigation into principles from
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database research and provides a foundation for an orchestration primitive. Orchestration aims to
automate the configuration and composition of multiple SDN applications. In particular, we formu-
late this problem as a data integration problem [68, 35]. We develop an algorithm to translate static
Pyretic [78] applications to Ravel (SQL) applications. We then demonstrate the feasibility of automat-
ically combining together and avoiding conflicts across multiple applications simultaneously controlling
a network by building on irrelevance reasoning [22, 70].
• A technique to repair policy-violating updates for unmodified SDN applications in real-
time. To enable an autocorrection primitive for network operators, we develop a tool called NEAt that
formulates the problem of repairing policy-violating updates as an integer linear programming (ILP)
problem. With NEAt, operators define correctness policies in the form of graphs. To meet real-time
performance constraints, we propose an algorithm to compress the network topology and equivalence
classes of the forwarding behavior, and solves the ILP problem on these compressed graphs.
Primitive Tool Chapter Layer of Operation
Fast-Forwarding [30, 29] DeLorean 2 Control Plane
Orchestration [99, 98] Ravel 3 Management Plane
Autocorrection [105] NEAt 4 Data Plane
Table 1.1: Primitives introduced in this thesis
1.4.1 Thesis Outline
Table 1.1 outlines each primitive discussed in this thesis and the layer at which it operators in an SDN.
In the following chapters, we describe in further detail each of these primitives. In Chapter 2, we present
our work on a fast-forwarding primitive through the design of DeLorean. In Chapter 3, we describe Ravel, a
SQL-based SDN controller that provides a foundation for an orchestration primitive for composing together
multiple SDN applications. In Chapter 4, we detail NEAt, an autocorrection primitive that repairs updates
on-the-fly. We highlight related work in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, we discuss future work and the application





One step in effectively controlling a software-defined network (SDN) is correct and predictable application
behavior in the control plane. Composing together or repairing updates from applications ridden with bugs
is a futile exercise. As such, this thesis first introduces a fast-forwarding primitive to verify and explore the
behavior of control programs, such as SDN and home automation (HA) applications, before examining an
orchestration primitive to automatically compose applications.
In particular, this chapter tackles the problem of systematically exploring the behavior of control ap-
plications that depend intimately on time. SDN and HA applications are written to depend on time, for
example, to take different actions for day vs. night, or expire DHCP leases. Traditional approaches toward
verification, i.e., model checkers, either require models of the code or do not accurately model time in favor
of scalability. Instead, this work aims to scalably verify temporal properties of actual code for HA and SDN
programs and, for HA programs, do so with a real-time performance constraint.
The work in this chapter was co-authored with Ratul Mahajan, Matthew Caesar, and Madan Musuvathi.
It was published in the 2015 USENIX Annual Technical Conference [30].
The main research questions associated with this primitive are:
• How can we scalably examine the behavior of a control plane application by checking all possible events
occurring at all possible times?
• How can we perform this exploration without first deriving an automaton from the program?
• What types of control programs benefit most from checking temporal correctness properties?




Control programs that orchestrate the actions of “dumb” devices are becoming increasingly popular.
The number of such devices, including locks, thermostats, motion sensors, and packet forwarding switches,
is projected to grow beyond 50 billion by 2020 [39]. In a similar vein, SDN has become a multi-billion dollar
market.
While control programs for these devices may be specified using simple languages (e.g., ISY [54], in the
case of home automation), reasoning about their correctness is an incredibly complex task. The programs
can have complex interactions across rules due to shared variables and device states. Further, time plays an
important role in program behavior, as the behavior can change with the time of day or the time between
occurrences of certain events. System behavior is often programmed directly to depend on time, in terms of
policies (e.g., different actions during day vs. night) and protocol behavior (e.g., DHCP leases). Therefore,
the behavior of these control programs is hard to verify by running the program a few times (e.g., during
development) and, as a result, many bugs are discovered in production. These bugs can compromise the
safety, security, and efficiency of the system.
One method of uncovering bugs is to systematically explore program behavior using model checking.
However, prior work [27, 46, 62, 79, 102] does not address an important aspect of program behavior, specif-
ically time. Instead, these tools abstract away time and, as a result, assume timers of different periods can
fire at any time and in any order. Similarly, comparisons involving time can nondeterministically return
true or false. Such an imprecise analysis of time is unacceptable for control programs because, as we show
later, it generates many states that are not reachable in practice. This can force developers to sort through
many false positive bugs reported by these tools. Furthermore, by abstracting time, these tools preclude
developers from verifying correctness properties involving time (e.g., that timers fire at the correct time and
under the correct conditions). Tools that use coarse heuristics to model time [103] eliminate false positives
at the expense of incomplete exploration.
Accurately modeling time when exploring program behavior is a non-trivial problem. The challenge arises
because events can occur at any time. To explore all possible behaviors, in theory, we must study all possible
events occurring at all possible times. However, this is an ill-defined concept since time is continuous. We
describe in § 2.2.1 why circumventing this issue by näıvely discretizing time is unsatisfactory.
We investigate the use of timed automata (TA) [16] to systematically explore the behavior of control
programs. TAs have been previously used to verify models of real-time systems. A TA is a finite state
machine extended with real-valued (not discrete) virtual clocks. TA transitions can specify constraints on
clock variables. For instance, a timeout transition should happen only when a particular clock variable is
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greater than a constant. The analyzability of TAs arises from the fact that, under certain conditions on clock
constraints, one can define a finite number of regions [16]. All program states within a region are equivalent
with respect to the untimed behavior of a system. Thus, “all possible times” can be safely translated to “all
possible regions.”
Prior work [19, 24] on exploring temporal behavior with TAs analyzes only an abstract model of a
program or system. However, errors can be introduced in the model if it does not faithfully capture the
behavior of the program, and the model can “drift” as the program evolves during development [79]. In this
chapter, we focus on using TAs to verify temporal properties of actual code. In particular, we ask: can TAs
be used to analyze executable programs? If so, what are the limitations of applying this theory to practice?
Exploring the temporal behavior of a program without the need to first derive a TA introduces several
new challenges. A TA-based exploration requires the set of temporal constraints that appear in the program.
We develop a method to extract this information using program analysis [65]. As with many verification
techniques, TA-based exploration inherits the state space explosion problem. As prior work is limited to
exploring only abstract models, most heuristics to reduce the state space assume full knowledge of the model
and cannot be used in our exploration. We develop three new techniques to boost exploration efficiency:
i) reducing the number of clock variables in the program, to cut down the number of regions we must
explore; ii) exploring the program as multiple, independent control loops; and iii) predicting the response
of the program to certain events, reducing the number of times we must execute the program.
We implement our approach for TA-based exploration in a tool called DeLorean and evaluate it in two
diverse domains: home automation and software-defined networks. We explore 10 real HA programs and
three SDN applications. Though DeLorean does not completely bridge the gap between the theory and
practice of exploring real code with TAs, we see measurable benefit. DeLorean finds bugs uncovered by
existing verification tools and new bugs that cannot be uncovered with existing techniques. We find we can
achieve higher fidelity in exploring behavior, resulting in improved state and code coverage. We achieve up
to 94% code coverage, compared to 76% in existing techniques that explore temporal behavior [103].
2.2 Background and Motivation
Many networked systems today are logically centralized. An HA system is composed of a controller
and devices such as light switches, motion sensors, and locks. The controller receives notifications from the
devices (e.g., when motion is sensed), can poll them for their current state (e.g., current temperature), and
can send them commands (e.g., turn on the light switch). It uses these capabilities to coordinate the devices.
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Similarly, in SDNs, a controller manages the operation of switches by configuring them to forward packets
as desired. The switches inform the controller when they receive packets for which forwarding actions have
not been configured.
At the core of logically centralized control systems is a control program that determines its behavior.
While the implementation languages for different systems and domains are different, control programs have
a common structure. Their operation can be understood in terms of a set of rules. Each rule has a trigger
and associated actions. A trigger is either an event in the environment (e.g., sensed motion, arrival of a
packet) or a firing timer. Actions include setting a device state (e.g., turn on the light, installing a new
rule in a switch) or a variable and setting timers. Actions can be conditioned on device state, variable and
timer values, and time of the day. Programs are single-threaded and each rule runs until completion before
another is processed.
Figure 2.1 shows an example program with three rules. Assume that the user wants to turn on the
front porch light when motion is detected and it is dark out, and to automatically turn off this light after 5
minutes if it is daytime. Rule 1 is triggered when motion is detected by the front porch motion sensor. It
turns on the light if motion is detected twice within 1 second and the light level sensed by a light meter is
less than 20. The first condition is a heuristic to filter out false positives in motion sensing, and the second
ensures that light is turned on only when it is dark. Rule 1 also updates the time when motion was last
detected. Rule 2 is triggered when the front porch light goes from off to on (either programmatically or
through human action) and sets a timer for 5 minutes. Rule 3 is triggered when this timer fires, and turns
off the light if the current time is between 6 AM and 6 PM.
2.2.1 Reasoning about Program Correctness
The correctness of control programs can be hard to reason about. Even if individual rules are simple,
reasoning about the program as a whole can be difficult because of complex interactions across rules. These
interactions arise from shared state across rules due to the state of variables and devices. Thus, the program’s
current behavior depends not only on the current trigger but also on the current state, which in turn is a
function of the sequence and timings of rules triggered in the past. This dependency and the number of
possible sequences makes predicting program behavior difficult.
As an example, even the simple program in Figure 2.1 has a behavior that may not be expected by the
user. Suppose the light is turned from off to on at 9:00 PM either due to sensed motion or by the user,
triggering Rule 2. Then, the user walks on to the front porch at 9:04:50 PM, triggering Rule 1. This user
might expect the light to stay on for at least 5 minutes, but it goes off unexpectedly 10 seconds later (at
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1 /* Rule 1 */
2 motionFrontPorch.Detected:
3 if (Now - timeLastMotion < 1 secs
4 && lightMeter.LightLevel < 20)
5 FrontPorchLight.Set(On);
6 timeLastMotion = Now;
7
8 /* Rule 2 */
9 frontPorchLight.StateChange:
10 if (frontPorchLightState == On)
11 timerFrontPorchLight.Reset(5 mins);
12
13 /* Rule 3 */
14 timerFrontPorchLight.Fired:
15 if (Now.Hour > 6 AM && Now.Hour < 6 PM)
16 FrontPorchLight.Set(Off);
Figure 2.1: An example home automation program
9:05 PM). The fix here is of course to reset the timer in Rule 1, but that may not be apparent to the user
until this behavior is encountered in practice.
Control programs are not the only ones whose correctness is difficult to reason about; the same holds
true for almost all real-world programs such as network protocols and distributed systems. As a result, in a
range of settings, researchers have developed a variety of techniques and corresponding tools, called model
checkers, to automatically explore program behavior [27, 79].
Complex Dependence on Time
The behavior of control programs can depend intimately on time, both absolute time and the relative
timing of triggers. For instance, the behavior of the program in Figure 2.1 depends on the time of day and
on how close in time two motion events fire.
Existing model checkers do not systematically model time. Most [27, 62, 79] perform untimed model
checking. They completely abstract time (in the interest of scalability) and do not maintain temporal
consistency. During exploration, calls to gettimeofday() return random values and timers can fire in any
order, regardless of their values. This can lead to many false positives (§ 2.5.4), i.e., bad states that will
not arise in practice. False positives can be highly problematic, and often worse than missing errors [103],
because they can send developers on a wild goose chase. Equally important for our context, since time is
abstracted, untimed model checkers cannot verify time-related properties of a system, which are of prime
interest for control programs.
One model checker that maintains temporal consistency is MoDist [103]. It has a global virtual clock,
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1 Trigger0:
2 timeTrigger0 = Now;
3 timeTrigger1 = Now;
4 trigger1Seen = false;
5 Trigger1:
6 if (Now - timeTrigger0 < 5 secs)
7 trigger1Seen = true;
8 Trigger2:
9 if (trigger1Seen)




Figure 2.2: An example home automation program
which is used to return values for gettimeofday(). Timers are fired in order and, when they do, the virtual
clock is advanced accordingly. It uses static analysis of program source to infer all timers, including implicit
timers. (Line 3 of Figure 2.1 represents an implicit timer that is set in Line 6 to expire in 1 second. Line
15 checks if the timer has fired, and the program behaves differently for the two cases.) During exploration,
MoDist explores two cases, one in which the timer has expired and one in which it has not. In each, the
clock value is set appropriately to a value that is consistent with the explored case.
While MoDist’s approach does not produce false positives, it does not comprehensively explore all possible
behaviors because exploring both cases for timers is not enough. Consider the simple example in Figure 2.2.
This program has three triggers: Trigger0 resets the control loops; Trigger1 is considered as seen if it occurs
within 5 seconds of Trigger0; and Trigger2 does different things depending on whether it occurs within 2
seconds of Trigger0. Assume that when Trigger0 fires, the virtual clock time of MoDist is T (seconds). While
exploring Trigger1, to cover both cases MoDist will select one virtual clock time in the range [T, T + 5) and
one greater than T + 5. But now it has a problem: while exploring Trigger2, it can only explore one of the
two branches (Line 10 or 12) and not both. If it had picked T + 1 in the first case, it cannot explore the
path on Line 13; if it had picked T + 3, it cannot explore the path on Line 11.
Note that at the point of exploring Trigger1, MoDist has no reason to believe the specific selection in the
range [T, T +5) matters. All choices lead to the same program state and paths, and only later the choice has
an impact. This is just one simple example; in reality, temporal constraints in the program can be highly
complex (e.g., the same timer may drive behavior in multiple places).
Without systematic modeling of the temporal behavior of the program, the only way MoDist can explore
all possible program behaviors is to explore all possible times of all possible triggers. But “all possible
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times” is ill-defined because time is continuous. We could discretize time and assume events happen only at
discrete moments. But picking a granularity of discretization is tricky — if it is too fine, the exploration will
have too much overhead as we would explore too many event occurrences; if it is too coarse, the exploration
will miss event sequences that occur at finer granularity in practice and lead to different behaviors. Simply
picking the smallest time-related constant in the program is also not enough [16]. Thus, there appears no
satisfactory way to pick a granularity that works for all events and programs.
We thus systematically reason about time by exploring the control program as a timed automaton
(TA) [16]. This lets us carve time into equivalence regions such that the exact timing of events within a
region is immaterial. Thus, instead of exploring all possible times, it suffices to explore all possible regions.
Time-Bound Correctness Properties
Untimed model checkers find violations of properties such as liveness (i.e., the system will eventually enter
a good state) and safety (i.e., the system never enters a bad state). Since these tools abstract time, they
cannot verify properties involving concrete time. For example, consider an SDN program caching mappings
of ports to MAC addresses. Entries should expire a certain period after their last access. An untimed model
checker can prove the entry expires after a certain sequence of events, but not that it expires after a certain
period of time. To prove such a property, we must prove time-bound liveness. Furthermore, untimed model
checkers cannot verify correctness properties based on absolute time, such as a light turning on at the right
time or never being on at a certain time. In our evaluation of HA programs, we find three bugs (P9-1, P9-2,
and P10-1 in § 2.5.5) with this type of invariant.
2.2.2 Timed Automata
To reason systematically about time, we use timed automata [16] to guide our exploration. TAs are finite
state machines extended with real-valued virtual clocks (VC), where a VC represents time elapsed since an
event. (Wall clock time is simply one possible VC, which measures elapsed time since Jan. 1, 1970.) The
state of a TA is the combination of the state of the underlying finite state machine together with the values
of all VCs. A TA transition changes the machine state and may reset one or more VCs. Each transition
specifies a set of clock constraints and is enabled from states that satisfy the constraint.
Figure 2.3 shows a TA that captures the behavior of the program in Figure 2.1. There are four states,
corresponding to the Cartesian product of whether the front porch light (FPL) is on or off and the current
light level (CLL). The TA uses three VCs to capture the time since i) the last motion (tlm), ii) the light was
turned on (tfpl), and iii) midnight (td). Transitions are labeled with their triggers (underlined), the clock
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Figure 2.3: A TA for the program in Figure 2.1
constraints (in parenthesis), and the clocks that are reset (in brackets). Motion denotes motion, and FplOn
and FplOff denote the physical acts of manipulating the light. Some transitions have multiple labels, one
for each situation where the TA can go from the source to the sink state. Transitions that have no triggers
are taken as soon as the clock constraints are met.
In general, systematic exploration of TAs is infeasible, even in theory, as VCs hold non-discrete real
values. However, the seminal work on TAs [16] shows that an exhaustive exploration is feasible provided the
VC constraints obey certain conditions. The conditions are that arithmetic operations cannot be performed
between two VCs and a VC cannot be involved in a multiplication or division operation. But adding or
subtracting constants to VCs is allowed, and so is comparing two VCs (potentially after adding or subtracting
constants).
Under these conditions the possible behaviors of the TA can be discretized into regions, such that the
(uncountably many) states in a region behave the same with respect to the correctness properties of the
TA. How such regions emerge can be intuitively understood if one observes that for the TA in Figure 2.3,
after a motion event, the future behaviors are determined by whether the succeeding motion event occurs
before or after 1 second. The exact timing of the second motion event is not critical. Regions exist in
multi-dimensional space where each dimension corresponds to one VC, and a point in the space represents
concrete values of all the VCs. Regions encompass a set of points such that the exact point is immaterial
for the purposes of comprehensive exploration.
The size of the region is proportional to the greatest common divisor (GCD) of constants in clock
constraints, and hence the exploration will be faster if the GCD is larger. Regions get exponentially smaller
as more VCs are included in the TA, because the plane for each pair of VCs divides open spaces into two
parts. Once the regions are known, fully exploring the TA’s behavior requires i) exploring all possible
transitions, in response to all possible triggers, from the current state; and ii) exploring exactly one delay
transition in which there is no state transition but all VCs advance by the same amount. This amount is
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Figure 2.4: Time regions for the example in Figure 2.2
such that the time progresses to the immediately succeeding region. Figure 2.4 shows the regions for the
example in Figure 2.2, which has two VCs. The constants in the clock constraints are 5 and 2, and thus the
GCD is 1. We get 92 regions in this example.
2.3 Our Approach
Our goal is to systematically explore control program behavior. From a starting time and state, we
want to predict all possible program behaviors. The exploration should be virtual so the actual state of the
devices is not impacted. The output should be the set of unique states the system can be in, along with the
sequence of events (i.e., triggers, actions) leading to that state.
2.3.1 Introducing Virtual Clocks
Control programs do not contain explicit references to VCs, but as mentioned previously, all time-related
activities in effect manipulate VCs.
There are three kinds of time-related activities in control programs. The first is measuring the relative
time between two events of interest (e.g., consecutive motion events). Here, a variable (e.g., timeLastMotion
in Figure 2.1) is used to store the time of the first event, which is then subtracted from the wall clock time
of the second event. To express this as a VC, we set the VC to zero when the first event occurs; the value
of the VC when the second event occurs yields the delay, since VCs progress at the same rate as the wall
clock unless reset.
The second time-related activity is a timer (e.g., timerFrontPorchLight in Figure 2.1). To capture this
activity using a VC, we reset the VC when the timer is set, and queue a timer trigger to fire after the desired
delay, after removing any previously queued event.
The third time-related activity is a sleep call, where actions for a rule are taken after a delay (e.g., turn
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on fan, sleep 30 seconds, turn it off). We express this by introducing a new timer and new rule. The actions
of the new rule corresponds to post-sleep actions of the original rule. The sleep and post-sleep actions in the
original rule are replaced by a timer that fires after the desired delay. In our treatment of sleep calls, if the
trigger for the original rule occurs again before the timer set by an earlier occurrence fires, the post-sleep
actions that correspond to the earlier trigger will not be carried out (because the earlier timer event will be
dequeued). This behavior is consistent with the semantics of the systems we study.
2.3.2 Systematically Exploring Behavior
Given a control program and its starting state as input, our goal is to explore a given duration of wall
clock time. A duration must be specified since wall clock time is unbounded and has an infinite number of
regions. For programs with no dependency on the wall clock (e.g., some SDN applications), no duration is
needed.
We assume that the program can be modeled as a TA. That is, all timers and variables that store time
in program are, in effect, VCs. To leverage time regions, these VCs must satisfy the conditions mentioned
above. We believe that these conditions are met in many contexts. They are certainly met in the different
systems that we study in § 2.5 and § 2.6. The scripting languages of some of these systems cannot even
express complex clock operations.
However, our exploration does not assume a TA has been derived from the actual code. Existing meth-
ods [19, 24] can explore the behavior of a TA, but deriving the entire TA corresponding to the program may
not be feasible. Even the smallest of control programs can have extremely large TAs, as it needs to capture
the program logic and its response to possible events.
Thus, we explore the TA dynamically, akin to how FSA-based model checkers dynamically explore the
FSA instead of deriving the complete FSA of the program. From a starting program state, we repeatedly
derive successor states resulting from triggers or delay transitions. For delay transitions, we must know the
timed regions in advance to compute the delay amount. Fortunately, constructing regions does not require
the complete TA, but only the constraints on the values of VCs [16]. We extract these constraints using
analysis of program source.
Figure 2.5 shows how we comprehensively explore program behavior. Assume we want to explore
FFDuration of behavior, starting from the program state S0. Program state includes the values of (non-time)
variables, VCs, and enabled timers (i.e., ready to fire). We do a breadth-first exploration using a queue of
unexplored states. Obtaining all successors of a state entails firing all possible events and all enabled timers.
If a successor state is not similar to any previously seen state, we add it to the queue. Two states are similar
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1: EndWC=Time.Now + FFduration; . How long to explore
2: S0.WC = Time.Now; . Set the wall clock
3: ES = {}; . explored states
4: US={S0}; . unexplored states
5: while US 6= φ do
6: Si = US.pop();
7: ES.push(Si);
8: for all e in Events, Si.EnTimers do
9: So = Compute(Si, e);




14: if Si.EnTimers = φ then
15: delay = DelayForNextRegion(Si.Region);
16: if Si.WC + delay > EndWC then
17: continue;
18: end if
19: So = Si.AdvanceAllVCs(delay);
20: for all timer in So.Timers do









Figure 2.5: Pseudocode for basic TA exploration
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if their variable values and set of enabled timers are identical and if their VC values map to the same region;
VC values need not be identical since the exact time within a region does not matter.
If the state being explored has no enabled timer, it is eligible for a delay transition. This represents
a period of time where nothing happens and time advances to the succeeding region. States with enabled
timers need to fire all enabled timers before time can progress. We ignore the successor if this delay takes
us past the end time (i.e., starting wall clock time + specified duration). Otherwise, the successor state is
computed by advancing all VCs. We treat wall clock time, which is virtualized during exploration, as any
other VC except that it never resets; it tracks the progress of absolute time. We then check if any of the
timers have been enabled because of this delay and mark them as such. The construction of time regions
guarantees that no timers are skipped during the delay transition.
2.3.3 Achieving Scalable Exploration
The basic TA-based exploration above correctly handles time but is too slow to be practical. We use
three general techniques to make it practical:
Predicting Successor States
Our first technique reduces the time to obtain successor states of a state being explored. We must first
define the notion of clock personality. Two program states have the same clock personality if their values of
all the VCs are equivalent with respect to all the clock constrains of the TA. Two program states can have
the same clock personalities even if they are not in the same region.
If two states S1 and S2 with the same clock personalities have identical variable values and enabled
timers, then any stimulus (i.e., combination of trigger and environmental conditions) will have exactly the
same effect on both states. Thus, it is necessary to compute the successor of only one such state, say S1.
The successor of S2 can be obtained from the successor of S1 while retaining the clock values of S2 for all
VCs except those that are reset by the current stimulus.
Computing a successor requires deserializing the parent’s state, running the program, subjecting it to the
stimulus, and serializing the successor’s state. These are costly operations. In contrast, prediction requires
only copying the state and modifying VC values.
Independent Control Loops
Our second optimization is based on the observation that large control programs may often be composed
of multiple, independent control loops manipulating different parts of the program state. For instance,
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thermostats and furnaces may be controlled by a climate control loop, and locks and alarms by a security
loop. These two may manipulate different variables and clocks, but otherwise share no state. In such cases,
we can explore the loops independently, instead of exploring them jointly. Separate exploration is faster
since joint exploration considers the Cartesian product of the values of independent variables and clocks.
We use taint tracking to identify independent loops.
Reducing the Number of Clocks
The number of VCs in the program has a significant impact on exploration efficiency because the size
of regions shrinks exponentially with it. When transforming a control program, we should introduce the
minimum number of VCs. We exploit two opportunities. First, consider cases where the actions in a
rule have multiple sleeps, e.g., action1; sleep(5); action2; sleep(10); action3. Instead of using two
timers (one per sleep), we can use only one because the two sleeps can never be active at the same time [31].
To retain the original dynamic behavior, we introduce a new program variable to track which actions should
be taken when the timer fires. In the example above, when the rule is triggered, after action1 is taken,
this variable is reset to 0 and the timer is set to fire after 5 seconds. When the timer fires: i) if the variable
value is 0, action2 is taken, the variable is set to 1, and the timer is set to fire after 10 seconds; ii) if the
variable value is 1, action3 is taken.
Second, control programs often have daily action for different times of day (e.g., sunrise, one hour after
sunrise). The straightforward translation is to introduce a new timer per unique activity. A more efficient
method is to use one timer to conduct all such activities, using a method similar to the above — introduce
an additional program variable to cycle through the different actions and reset it after the last action is
conducted.
2.3.4 Theory-Practice Gap
Existing TA-based model checkers work with abstract models and assume the model is provided as input.
In building the model incrementally and dynamically, we uncover several gaps in using TAs on real code.
A transition in a TA must occur instantaneously since time only progresses explicitly through a delay
transition. In practice, however, the processing of an event (e.g., in response to motion occurring) may
involve a non-trivial amount of time. In our implementation, we assume processing time is instantaneous,
but propose a technique to handle events with non-trivial processing times. For each of these event handlers
in the program, we can introduce a timer to expire after the expected processing time. When the timer is
active and has not expired, the system is processing the event. If the timer is inactive, either because the
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Figure 2.6: Overview of DeLorean
timer has expired or has not been activated, the system is not processing the event.
In some systems, clocks may be created in response to events. In SDN programs, for example, flows
installed in switches in response to a packet arrival at the controller introduce two new VCs — one each for
the soft and hard timeouts. We can use symbolic execution to extract the clock constraints for all possible
values of timeouts, but we cannot determine the number of occurrences of the event triggering this behavior.
Rather, this is dependent on the number of times the event occurs along a path generating a specific state.
We cannot add a new clock with a new constraint to the region construction, as we cannot change regions
during exploration. Regions are constructed using the GCD of the clock constraints and adding a new clock
mid-exploration could change the delay if the GCD changes. Instead, we pre-allocate a number of VCs,
each with a specific constraint. During exploration, when a new VC needs to be created, it is allocated an
available VC from a queue of pre-allocated VCs.
2.4 Design
We now describe the design of DeLorean, our TA-based model checker. As shown in Figure 2.6, the
primary inputs to DeLorean is the control program — including a model of the controller (on which the
program runs) and devices — and the duration of wall clock time to explore (FFDuration). If the program
has no dependence on wall clock time, i.e., timers are relative, FFDuration is not needed. The user can also
specify three optional inputs. The first is a list of invariants on device states and system behavior, which
should be satisfied at all times. These are specified in a manner similar to the if conditions in the rules and
can include time. The second is the wall clock time at the start of the exploration. The third is the starting
state of (a subset of) devices and variables from which exploration should begin.
The output of DeLorean is all the unique states of the devices. If invariants are specified and violated
by any state during the exploration, we also output the state. In addition, DeLorean outputs the path that
leads to each state — a timestamped sequence of triggers, along with the values of environmental factors
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during those firings.
DeLorean has three stages. First, the front end converts the program to one where clocks have been
virtualized, using the method in § 2.3.1. Second, pre-exploration analyzes this program to recover information
required for the optimizations in § 2.3.3. The final stage is the exploration itself.
2.4.1 Pre-Exploration
This stage analyzes the program produced by the front end to recover the information needed for con-
structing timed regions and implementing the optimizations in § 2.3.3. Here, we use symbolic execution [65]
of program source. Symbolic execution simulates the execution of code using a symbolic value σx to represent
the value of each variable x. As the symbolic executor runs, it updates the symbolic store that maintains
information about program variables. For example, after the assignment y=2x the symbolic executor does
not know the exact value of y but has learned that σy=2σx. At branches, symbolic execution uses a con-
straint solver to determine the value of the guard expression given the information in the store. The executor
only explores the branch corresponding to the guard’s value as returned by the constraint solver, ensuring
infeasible paths are ignored. If there is insufficient information to determine the guard’s value, both branches
are explored. This produces a tree of all possible program execution paths. Each path is summarized by a
path condition that is the conjunction of branch choices made to go down that path.
We symbolically execute the program’s main control loop, which is the starting point for all processing
activity. We configure the symbolic executor to treat the following entities as symbolic: program state
(variables and clocks) and the parameters of the control loop. The output of the symbolic executor is the set
of possible paths for each possible trigger. For each path, we obtain the i) constraints that must hold for the
program to traverse that path, and ii) the program state that results after its traversal. The constraints and
the resulting program state are in terms of input symbols, the entities we made symbolic in the configuration.
We can now recover the following information.
Virtual Clock Constraints These are required for constructing time regions and for predicting successor
states. We obtain them from the output of symbolic execution by taking the union of constraints on VCs
along each path. Additionally, program statements that reset a timer x to k seconds are essentially clock
constraints of the form x ≥ k. We extract such statements from the program source and add corresponding
constraints to the set.
Independent Control Loops We also use the output of symbolic execution for taint tracking. We analyze
the program state that results from each path. If the final value of a variable along any path is different
from its (symbolic) input value, that variable is impacted along the path. This impact depends on the input
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symbols that appear in the output value (data dependency) and path constraints (control dependency). The
variables corresponding to those input symbols are tainting the variable.
We use this information to identify independent sets of variables and VCs. Two variables or VCs are
deemed dependent if they either taint each other in the program, or they occur together in a user-supplied
invariant (as we must do a joint exploration in this case as well). After determining pairwise dependence,
we compute the independent sets that cover all variables and VCs.
2.4.2 Exploration
This stage implements the method outlined in § 2.3. To start, it runs the program and initializes the
starting state. We then checkpoint the program by serializing its internal state. The checkpoint captures
the values of all variables, including time related variables, and the times when various timers will fire.
We maintain a table that contains the values of the VCs of a state. Many states differ only in VC values
— the successor state after a delay transition differs from the parent only in VC values, so does the successor
that is predicted from another state. Maintaining this table separately lets us quickly obtain these successor
states. It also helps reduce the memory footprint, since two states that differ only in VC values can share
the same checkpoint. However, this implies that the VC values in a table can be out of sync with those
embedded in the checkpoint. Thus, when restoring a state, we update its VC values from the table before
any other processing.
2.4.3 Implementation
DeLorean is implemented with 10k+ lines of C# code. The bulk of this code implements the pre-
exploration and exploration stage, which we developed from scratch. We could not use existing tools for
exploring TAs [19, 24] because we do not have the complete TA for the program. Our implementation
includes models of controllers and devices in the two domains we study: home automation (§ 2.5) and
software-defined networks (§ 2.6).
For HA applications, we implemented front end modules for two systems: ISY [54] and ELK [37]. We
chose these two because of their popularity. The front end parses ISY or ELK programs using ANTLR [17]
and produces a C# program that captures the behavior of the program and contains additional variables,
rules, and actions needed for modeling devices. As the state of these devices is typically simple and can
be represented using boolean or integer variables, we can model the devices automatically from the ISY or
ELK program.
The pre-exploration stage uses Pex [94] to symbolically execute the main event loop of this C# program.
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type #rules #devs SLoC #VCs GCD (s)
P1 OmniPro 6 3 59 2 7200
P2 Elk 3 3 75 2 1800
P3 MiCasaVerde 6 29 143 2 300
P4 Elk 13 20 193 5 5
P5 ActiveHome 35 6 216 14 5
P6 mControl 10 19 221 4 5
P7 OmniIIe 15 27 277 6 60
P8 HomeSeer 21 28 393 10 2
P9 ISY 25 51 462 6 60
P10 ISY 90 39 867 6 10
Table 2.1: The HA programs we studied
Pex is a modern symbolic execution engine that mixes concrete and symbolic execution (“concolic” execution)
to boost path coverage and efficiency.
2.5 Case Study: HA Networks
To evaluate a TA-based exploration against existing verification techniques, we examined DeLorean in
two environments: home automation networks and SDNs.
2.5.1 Domain-Specific Optimizations
A common behavior in HA is a dependence on environmental factors (e.g., temperature, light level)
sensed by devices in the system. For a comprehensive evaluation, we must explore all combinations of values
of external factors. To address this challenge, we build on prior work and combine symbolic execution
with model checking [27]. We use symbolic execution of program source to infer equivalence classes of
combinations of values of environmental factors. In Figure 2.1, for example, there are two equivalence
classes, corresponding to light level values below or higher than 20. During exploration, we then use one set
of values per class, instead of exploring all possible combinations of values.
2.5.2 Dataset
We evaluated DeLorean using real HA programs. We solicited these programs on a mailing list for HA
enthusiasts. We picked the 10 programs shown in Table 2.1. We selected them for the diversity of HA
systems and the number of rules and devices. We see that most installations have tens of rules and devices,
with the maximums being 90 and 51. This points to the challenge users face in predictably controlling
their homes. Collectively, these installations had 19 different types of devices, including motion sensors,
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# Transitions CPU Time (sec) Reduction w/ Prediction
P1 72 0.10 -11.11%
P2 123 0.12 -20%
P3 178 0.15 -7.14%
P4 19.7M 176.10 75.16%
P5 78.7K 1.03 61.28%
P6 51K 1.04 48%
P7 36.M 17.87 89.53%
P8 8.1M 89.50 84.36%
P9 121M 793.90 95.24%
P10 256M 998.0 83.5%
Table 2.2: Performance for exploring one hour of wall clock time and the reduction in CPU time from
predicting states
temperature sensors, sprinklers, and thermostats.
The table shows the source lines of code (SLoC) and the number of VCs in the program after transforma-
tion in the first stage. Systems which we have not implemented a front end yet were transformed manually.
We see that most installations have five or more VCs, indicating a heavy reliance on time. The table also
shows the GCD across all constants in VC constraints in the program. The GCD can be coarsely thought
of as the detail with which the program observes the passage of time. Since the size of the regions depends
on the GCD, it also heavily influences the exploration time.
2.5.3 Exploration Performance
We ran DeLorean over all 10 programs and conduct 20 trials, each with a randomly selected starting
state and time (since program behavior depends on both). All experiments used an 8 core 2.5Ghz Intel Xeon
PC with 16GB RAM. Table 2.2 shows the number of transitions and average CPU time needed to explore
one hour of wall clock time for each program. We estimate DeLorean makes 200k transitions per second.
Since HA programs depend on wall clock time, we can also measure the CPU time with respect to wall clock
time. We also see that DeLorean can explore real programs 3.6 times to 36K times faster than wall clock
time.
An important element in obtaining quick explorations for these programs is predicting successor states.
While this is a general optimization for dynamically exploring TAs, its effectiveness depends on how often
we encounter non-similar states with identical clock personalities, variables, and enabled timers. To evaluate
it, Table 2.2 shows the percentage reduction in CPU time when prediction is used compared to when it is
not used. For the smallest programs, prediction leads to slower exploration. This is because in such cases
the overhead associated with checking for past states that can be used for prediction is greater than any
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Figure 2.7: Invalid states generated by untimed exploration
benefit it brings. However, for larger programs, prediction brings substantial benefit. For P9, prediction
cuts the exploration time by 95%, i.e., exploring without prediction is slower by a factor of 20.
2.5.4 Comparison with Alternatives
Untimed Exploration
As mentioned earlier, current model checkers ignore time and can thus generate invalid program states
that will not be generated in real executions. If there were just a few, it is conceivable that users would be
willing to put up with occasional incorrectness. However, we found that untimed exploration results in many
incorrect states. Figure 2.7 shows the percentage of additional, invalid states produced by untimed model
checking,1 when beginning from the same starting state as DeLorean and running until it cannot find any
new states. Untimed exploration differs from DeLorean in three aspects: i) in addition to successors based
on device notifications, each state has successors based on each queued timer, independent of the target time
of the timer; ii) if a comparison to time is encountered during exploration both true and false possibilities
are considered; iii) there are no delay transitions. The graph averages results over 10 paired trials with
different starting inputs, and the error bars shows maximum and minimum percentage of invalid states.
We see that untimed exploration produces a significant number of invalid states. For most programs, the
number of invalid states is of the same order as the number of valid states produced by DeLorean. Closer
inspection of results from untimed exploration provides insight into how some invalid states are produced.
One common case is where devices such as lights are programmed to turn on in the evening, using a timer.
1This comparison based on invalid states alone hides one additional limitation of untimed model checking. Untimed explo-
ration is incapable of verifying program behaviors that depend on time (e.g., light turned off a second after turning on).
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Because timers can fire anytime, untimed model checking incorrectly predicts that the light can be off in the
evening, which will not happen in practice. Another case is where certain actions are meant to occur in a
sequence, e.g., open the garage door after key press and then close it 5 minutes later. With DeLorean, these
actions are carried out in the right sequence, correctly predicting that the door is left in the closed state.
But both possible sequences are explored by untimed exploration, one which incorrectly predicts that the
garage door is left open.
Figure 2.8: Code coverage
MoDist
Unlike untimed exploration, MoDist maintains temporal consistency during exploration, but at the ex-
pense of incomplete exploration (§ 2.2.1). To illustrate this, we implemented MoDist’s algorithm for exploring
timers in DeLorean and compared it with our exploration. We compared two metrics: state coverage and
code coverage. State coverage measures the number of unique program states explored and code coverage
measures the number of lines of code exercised during exploration. Figures 2.8 and 2.9 show code and state
coverage, respectively, for MoDist and DeLorean averaged over 24 trials, each exploring one hour. Programs
omitted in Figure 2.8 have equivalent coverage in MoDist and DeLorean.
2.5.5 Unintended Behaviors
To informally gauge DeLorean’s ability to find such behaviors, we inspected comments in two of the
programs (P9, P10) and translated them into invariants for which DeLorean should report violations. We
found four violations.
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Figure 2.9: States missed by MoDist
P9-1 A comment indicated the lights in the back of the house should turn on if motion is detected in
the evening (i.e., sunset to 11:35PM). But DeLorean found that the lights could be on even if there was no
motion. A rule appeared misprogrammed — instead of using conjunction as the condition to turn on the light
(sunset < Now < 11:35PM && MotionDetected), it was using disjunction (sunset < Now < 11:35PM ||
MotionDetected)
P9-2 A comment indicated the front porch light should stay on from a half hour after sunset until 2AM.
There were two rules to implement this invariant: one turning the light on at a half hour after sunset
and one turning it off at 2AM. But DeLorean found cases where the light was off in that time window.
Inspection revealed another rule to turn off the light at 7:45PM. Thus, the invariant is violated if sunset
occurs after 7:15PM, which can happen where the user of P9 resides. Exploring sunset values higher than
7:15PM uncovered the violation.
P10-1 A comment indicated the user wanted to turn on a dimmer switch in the master bath room when
motion is detected. But we found instances where the motion occurred but the dimmer was not on. Inspection
revealed that the user’s detailed intent, implemented using two rules, was to turn on the dimmer half-way
when motion occurs during the day, and to turn it on fully when it’s detected during night. But the way
day and night time periods were defined left a 2 minute gap where nothing would happen in response to
motion.
P10-2 A comment indicated the user wanted to treat three devices identically (i.e., all on or all off).
Inspection of a violation of this invariant showed that while three of the four rules that involved these
devices correctly manipulated them as a group, one rule had left out a device.
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#trans
SLoC #VCs GCD (s) 1 VC 2 VCs 4 VCs
PySwitch 234 13 1 6210 49k 8.8M
LoadBalancer 2063 14 2 351k 512k 3.8M
EnergyTE 434 10 5 442k 1.7M 21M
Table 2.3: The OpenFlow programs we studied
2.6 Case Study: SDN
To further demonstrate the value of TA-based exploration, we modeled and tested SDN programs in
DeLorean. Similar to NICE [27], we created a model of the NOX platform in C#, including the controller,
switches, and hosts. We discover relevant packet headers during pre-exploration, using Pex to symbolically
execute the event handlers that make up the OpenFlow program. Since OpenFlow switches have complex
internal behavior (e.g., flow tables) that we cannot observe externally, we manually defined models of Open-
Flow switches and hosts. OpenFlow programs have no dependency on absolute time, therefore we used no
wall clock time.
2.6.1 Dataset
We evaluated DeLorean using three real programs: a MAC-learning switch (PySwitch), a web server
load balancer[100], and energy-efficient traffic engineering (EnergyTE) [96]. We manually translated the
programs from Python into C# for testing in DeLorean. Table 2.3 shows the source lines of code (SLoC),
the total number of VCs that can be dynamically created during an exploration, and the GCD of the clock
constraints. As in NICE, we bound the state space by limiting certain events, such as the number of times
a host sends a packet.
Each program has dependencies on relative time. PySwitch, for example, uses a timer to periodically
check entries in a cache of MAC address-port mappings and expire entries older than a specific time. In this
case, a VC is needed to express the timer scheduling the periodic check, and another VC for each entry in
the cache.
2.6.2 Comparison with Alternatives
We compared DeLorean to NICE, a model checker for OpenFlow programs. Similar to untimed model
checking, NICE does not systematically model time. Instead, application-specific heuristics are used to
trigger timers in each of the SDN applications tested. We constructed a model of the NOX controller [14]
for DeLorean and simulated NICE’s exploration by running DeLorean with no VCs. We also implemented
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NICE’s heuristics for exploring timer behavior. To informally gauge DeLorean’s ability to find unintended
behaviors, we created invariants from the 11 bugs discovered by NICE. We find DeLorean can reproduce
violations for all 11 bugs.
Figure 2.10: Code coverage in DeLorean and NICE
Next, we compared DeLorean’s coverage of a program’s state space to that of NICE. In Figure 2.10, we
show the code coverage of DeLorean and NICE for the three programs. In PySwitch, NICE does not explore
the timer for periodically checking cache entries, leaving a function unexplored.
In Table 2.4, we show the number of missed and incorrect states generated by NICE compared to
explorations in DeLorean using 1, 2, and 4 VCs. Because NICE does not trigger any timers in PySwitch,
it misses potential behavior, but does not introduce any invalid states that would be generated from timers
firing at incorrect times from incorrect states The heuristic for triggering timers in the EnergyTE application,
however, fires timers from every possible state, resulting in invalid states. Similarly, in LoadBalancer, timers
can also fire from invalid states.
Further, NICE’s heuristics do not test the expiration of flows. Correctly exploring this behavior, as well
as verifying correctness properties related to flow expirations, requires more systematic treatment of time.
This results in missed states in both the EnergyTE and LoadBalancer applications.
We see that with non-systematic treatment of time, program exploration can introduce false behaviors
or miss potential behaviors. In programs dependent on absolute and relative time, such as HA programs,
we found untimed exploration can produce too many invalid states to be useful. Even in programs with
dependencies only on relative time, such as SDN programs, we see non-systematic treatment of time can
also produce as many invalid states as valid states.
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% Missing % Incorrect
1 VC 2 VCs 4 VCs 1 VC 2 VCs 4 VCs
PySwitch 0% 34% 84% 0% 0% 0%
LoadBalancer 95% 95% 95% 117% 123% 123%
EnergyTE 69% 87% 97% 26% 12% 46%
Table 2.4: Missing and invalid states generated by NICE, compared to explorations in DeLorean using 1, 2,
and 4 VCs
2.7 Observations and Future Work
A tool such as DeLorean is most useful to programs with a deep dependency on time. In particular,
we found that programs that depend on both absolute (i.e., time of day) and relative time exhibit the
most interesting behavior to analyze with TAs. Moreover, these types of programs tend to be harder to
reason about, since one must consider the interaction of relative timers with absolute time (e.g., the bug in
Figure 2.1 described in § 2.2.1). All HA programs we found had such complex interactions, while all SDN
programs we examined use only relative time.
A confluence of the two domains we study is Lithium [64], which extends the control domain for SDNs to
include time (both relative and absolute), history, and users, rather than only flows.2 Policies can be defined
to allow guest access to a network during certain times of day with a limit on data usage. We believe that
as more “dumb” devices become network-capable, the demand for this type of control of a network will only
increase, as will the importance of tools to comprehensively explore the behavior of these types of policies.
Additionally, we believe timed model checking could be a useful tool in checking performance properties
in these domains. We plan to investigate this application of DeLorean in future work, as well as other
contexts where time is important [28].
2We considered studying Lithium policies in our evaluation, but the authors’ prototype did not include the implementation





Given a set of correct control plane applications, a network operator can then focus on ensuring the
applications are correct at the management plane. To do so, an operator must determine a composition plan
for the applications that results in a coherent and consistent data plane. However, operations within appli-
cations may conflict with operations in other applications, requiring a prioritization across applications (or
operations). Therefore, an operator may need to understand the implementation details of each application
driving the network, how each will respond to every possible event, and how those responses will conflict
with or trigger behaviors in the other applications controlling the network.
To help an operator compose together applications, this chapter introduces an orchestration [98, 99]
primitive through a new approach for thinking about SDN applications. In particular, we investigate the
use of a database as the building block for an SDN controller, and the power it brings to solve challenging
application composition and management problems. Although prior domain-specific languages [81, 78] for
SDN controllers have built on a SQL-like syntax, this is the first work to build an SDN controller entirely on
top of a standard database. This work is motivated by the belief that SDN fundamentally revolves around
data representation, and by adopting a relational representation of the network, we can build on a large
body of database research that has applications to current challenges in SDN.
The work in this chapter was co-authored with Anduo Wang, Matthew Caesar, and P. Brighten Godfrey.
It was published in the 2016 ACM Symposium on SDN Research (SOSR) [99].
This work seeks to answer the following research questions:
• With constantly changing network demands, what are the “right” programming abstractions for net-
work applications? Can a relational representation of the network enable easier design of new abstrac-
tions and composition across them?
• Can this representation allow for easier and automated composition of multiple SDN applications?
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3.1 Introduction
SDNs employ APIs to control switch data planes via a logically centralized controller. This provides
a platform so that it is possible to write software that can control network-wide behavior. To make that
programming easy, it is generally agreed that higher-level abstractions are needed, but there is little consensus
on what are the “right” abstractions. Frenetic [44], Pyretic [78], and NetCore [77] introduce functional
constructs that enable modular creation of SDN control. Flowlog [81] extends this functional abstraction to
the data plane by adding SQL-like rule constructs. FatTire [89] and Merlin [91] add additional language-
level support for fault-tolerance and resource provisioning. On the other hand, to address stateful middlebox
and service chaining, Kinetic [63] and PGA [87] raise the abstraction level using state automata and graph
expressions.
Indeed, as the network evolves over time, the need for abstractions will likely outgrow the abstractions
of the present, thus requiring a continual “upgrade” that extends or raises the level of existing abstraction.
Each “upgrade” incurs the tremendous effort of careful design of a new abstraction and engineering of the
supporting runtime. With the deployment of drastically different abstractions, the network will be jointly
driven by multiple controls created with disparate abstractions. Orchestration of these controls across many
abstractions is therefore needed. Current approaches, however, only offer a fragmented solution: higher-
level coordination often depends on and is restricted to the use of certain abstractions [78, 87, 63], while
abstraction-agnostic support depends on common structures (e.g., OpenFlow rules, network state variables)
that are usually low-level [76, 93, 56].
To this end, we champion a perspective that SDN control fundamentally revolves around data represen-
tation. We discard any application-specific structure that might be outgrown by new demands. Instead,
we adopt a plain data representation of the entire network — network topology, forwarding, and control
applications — and seek a universal data language that allows application programmers to transform the
primitive representation into any high-level representations to present to applications or network operators.
Driven by this insight, we present a system, Ravel, that implements an entire SDN network control infras-
tructure within a standard SQL database. We take the entire SDN network control system under the hood of
a standard SQL database, and rely on SQL for data manipulation, the database runtime for data mediation,
and propose a novel protocol that refines the database runtime to enforce only orchestrated execution.
Furthermore, by adopting a relational representation of the network, we can build on database research
to solve challenging SDN problems. In particular, we formulate the application composition problem as a
data integration problem. In doing so, we can build on database research in irrelevant updates [22, 70, 38]
to discover dependencies between applications.
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We present a realization of our approach, Ravel, which offers attractive advantages:
Ad-hoc programmable abstractions via database views. The database view construct enables new
abstractions to be constructed ad-hoc and enables them to build on each other. For example, from the
“base tables” defining the network topology and OpenFlow forwarding rules, one can construct a view
representing a virtual network that spans a subset of the topology; and one can further derive a load
balancer’s view of host availability within the virtual network. These SQL views form the structure of
the abstractions. Furthermore, integrity constraints over the views express high-level policy invariants and
objectives. These views and constraints can be expressed via SQL statements and can even be constructed
ad-hoc, i.e., dynamically in the running controller.
Orchestration across abstractions via view mechanisms. Once we have a mechanism to construct
ad-hoc abstractions, we need to coordinate across these multiple views of a single network. View mainte-
nance [47] and update [18, 23, 40, 32, 60] mechanisms are the “runtime” for view abstractions, constructed
through normal SQL operations (i.e., queries and updates). First, view maintenance continuously refreshes
the view abstractions of a dynamic network. Second, to translate updates in a derived view back down
to a lower-level view, Ravel allows users to define a view update policy that governs how updates on the
higher-level abstraction are realized on the underlying data plane via triggers, which can incorporate custom
heuristics at runtime to optimize applications.
Orchestration across applications via a data mediation protocol. In Ravel, an orchestration protocol
mediates multiple applications whose database modifications affect each other. The protocol assumes a
simple conflict resolution strategy — an ordering of view constraints where lower-ranked constraints yield to
the higher-ranked. Given a view update request as input, the protocol produces as output an orchestrated
update set that respects all applications constraint (subject to conflict resolution). The orchestrated set
may append to the request additional updates for completion (e.g., invoking a routing application when an
access control application attempts to remove an unsafe path) or reject the update if a cohesive update is
not possible.
Automated orchestration with irrelevance reasoning. Building on our relational representation of
the network, we extend our data mediation protocol and introduce dependency reasoning to automatically
determine dependencies between applications. Using these dependencies, Ravel can automate orchestration
by searching for conflict-free compositions plans.
Network control via SQL. The entire Ravel system above is exposed to application programmers and
network engineers via standard SQL interfaces and database view, constraint, and trigger mechanisms. We
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believe this is likely to be valuable both technically and as a way to encourage more rapid uptake of SDN.
SQL databases have proved over decades to be an effective platform for high-level manipulation of data,
and are broadly familiar (e.g., compared to domain-specific languages). Moreover, network architects today
need to combine heterogeneous data sources — network forwarding rules, data flow and QoS metrics, host
intrusion alerts, and so on — to produce a cohesive view of the network and investigate problems. This
could be eased by the interoperability of SQL databases.
We note that certain past SDN controllers have employed databases as specific limited modules, including
state distribution, distributed processing, and concurrency and replication control. For example, Onix [66]
delegates to distributed databases for concurrency and replication of low-level network state in a common
pre-defined data schema. The database silently accepts and executes transactions submitted by external
control applications. Declarative networking [72, 71, 74], on the other hand, uses a distributed query engine
for fast processing of customized routing protocols, where the database executes routing queries submitted
by end-hosts. In contrast, Ravel makes the database an active participant that uses views to incorporate
multiple high-level and low-level abstractions of the network, which are orchestrated online. In other words,
in Ravel, the database is the controller.
While this is an ambitious long-term goal, our Ravel prototype built on the PostgreSQL database [12]
exhibits promising performance even for large scale networks. On fat-tree (up to 5,120 switches / 196,608
links) and ISP (up to 5,939 nodes / 16,520 links) topologies, we microbenchmark Ravel delay, uncovering
the sources of database overhead, showing that the database operations and orchestration of the various
applications all scale to large network and policy sizes. On a physical SDN network, we find Ravel can
translate changes in the database to flow modification commands within 1ms and install the change in
switch flow tables within 50ms. On real-world firewall rules, Ravel control applications can maintain service
chain sizes up to one million within 11 seconds, and handle queries in <1ms. Our Ravel prototype also
integrates into the database runtime a classic view maintenance algorithm that automatically translates an
arbitrary user view into an equivalent high-performance materialized table. This improves access on views
by one to two orders of magnitude with a small maintenance overhead on the materialized table. To the best
of our knowledge, Ravel showcases the first high-performance database controller over a hardware OpenFlow
network, and our evaluation presents the first comprehensive feasibility study of such a controller.
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3.2 Motivation
3.2.1 A Motivating Example
Consider the task of managing an enterprise network with SDN-enabled abstractions. In the beginning,
network control is simple end-to-end communication policies in the form of routing and security (e.g., a
firewall). As the business grows and the organization splits into several independent compartments including
human resources (HR) and research and development (R&D), the network desires additional support to
enable the compartments to jointly drive the network. Specifically, each compartment could independently
create, modify, and control a (potentially overlapping) sub-net of the enterprise network. The compartments
also desire a more natural and concise expression of end-to-end communication. Rather than explicitly
enumerating all pairs of individual endpoints, the compartments need an aggregated expression for policies
between endpoint groups, the member endpoints of which are under the same policy due to a shared property.
3.2.2 Enlarging and Fragmented Abstractions and Orchestration
Abstractions
Initially, the requirement for network abstraction is only concerned with high-level control for basic
forwarding, including routing and access control through a firewall. It is thus natural to use Pyretic [78],
which uses a programming framework that features a forwarding policy as function abstraction and a runtime
that compiles this abstraction into lower-level OpenFlow representations. However, Pyretic lacks a language-
level construct to directly control a firewall, or middleboxes in general. Instead, we add an additional layer
for this purpose, namely Kinetic [63]. Kinetic adds state automata abstractions to Pyretic that allow control
of a firewall (or any stateful middlebox) through the state automata construct, and extends the runtime to
compile the state automata policy into lower-level Pyretic code.
Next, as the need for multiple compartments to independently control endpoint groups outgrows the
capacity of Pyretic and Kinetic, a new abstraction found in PGA [87] can be added. Like Kinetic, PGA
raises the abstraction level of Pyretic with constructs for service chain graphs over groups, as well as a
runtime that analyzes and merges the service chains. At this point, our repository of abstraction grows into
a list of disparate constructs — functions, state automata, and chain graphs — as shown in Figure 3.1 (left).
While enjoying the higher-level control from each construct, we are faced with the problem of making
them coexist. Integration of Pyretic and Kinetic and likewise Pyretic and PGA is straightforward. As Kinetic
and PGA are Pyretic-extensions that add higher-layer constructs, they are “user-space” tasks that do not































Figure 3.1: Abstraction and orchestration: current approach vs. Ravel
work — a “system-space” job that requires re-writing the internals of the two systems. In the case of Kinetic
and PGA, one has to modify the systems to feed Kinetic outputs (i.e., intermediate Pyretic representation
of the middleboxes) to PGA for service chain analysis and merging. Additional syntax-sugar wrapper that
eases the usage of two drastically different constructs might also be desirable.
As long as an abstraction depends on a set of pre-compiled, fixed constructs, it is likely that even the
best design of the present will be outgrown by the requirements of the future. Researchers will have to
develop an ever-growing body of abstractions (and supporting runtimes), and network operators will have to
continually upgrade their system to the latest one. Depending on the nature of the newly added abstraction,
the upgrade can incur additional integration overhead for re-wiring system internals.
Orchestration
Because the enterprise network can be collectively driven by multiple controls expressed with a diverse
set of abstractions, we need proper orchestration across these abstractions.
First, a control policy can correspond to multiple layers of abstractions. For example, a security policy
controlling access through a firewall could be specified by an operator in the form of a PGA graph expression.
Eventually, it will be compiled by the PGA runtime into intermediate Pyretic functions. Finally, it will be
implemented by the Pyretic runtime as OpenFlow rules. We term this translation of the same policy across
multiple abstraction layers as vertical orchestration. Vertical orchestration with existing abstractions depends
on the underlying runtime of each abstraction involved.
Second, multiple policies can also simultaneously direct overlapping flow space on shared network re-
sources. Consider scenario (A) of a flow bypassing a firewall. This behavior can be jointly controlled by
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a Pyretic routing application and a PGA service chain. In a more interesting case (B), suppose servers
within a network accept in-bound flows from external hosts only if the server initiates the connection. Such
a policy can be achieved using a Kinetic automata and a PGA graph, where the Kinetic automata specifies
the stateful firewall behavior while the PGA graph directs all in-bound flows through the Kinetic firewall.
Besides these collaborative scenarios, controls can also compete for resources. For example, in scenario (C),
consider two compartments simultaneously migrating networks that may overload overlapping switches and
links. This undesirable race condition is not addressed by any participant’s control logic, and must be de-
tected and resolved. Overall, we term the coordination of multiple abstractions to form a consistent packet
processing behavior as horizontal orchestration.
While a generic system exists, it can operate at a common level that is often too low-level for a network
operator. For example, CoVisor [56] merges control on OpenFlow rules and Statesman [93] depends on hard-
wired network state variables. Therefore, existing abstractions often provide some degree of orchestration
within their system scope, such as modular composition of abstraction constructs. However, depending on
the nature of the orchestration scenario, it is likely that operators will have to rely on an ensemble of frag-
mented facilities, ranging from language-level composition at compile time to specialized state management
frameworks at runtime. For example, in (A), we can leverage Pyretic’s modular composition facility to com-
bine routing and access control, given that both component modules are developed in Pyretic. In (B), which
crosses two system boundaries and involves two distinctly different abstractions, additional integration is
needed to wire control together. For (C), one must use a low-level state management system like Statesman.
3.2.3 Our Approach: An Open and Consolidated Solution using SQL
To address the limitations found in today’s network abstractions, Ravel discards any fixed abstraction
constructs that are bound to application features. Instead, Ravel leverages a unifying system — a standard
SQL database — to provide ad-hoc extensible abstractions that are sufficient for the diverse needs of the
present and the future, and offer an out-of-box high-performance runtime that creates an insertion point for
orchestration protocols.
Abstractions
To support a variety of abstractions without dependencies on specialized constructs, Ravel uses a plain
data representations and a universal data language, namely database relations and SQL statements.
As shown in Figure 3.1 (right), the various forms of abstraction (e.g., Pyretic functions, Kinetic state
automata) all take the form of plain database relations. The relations are defined using simple, familiar SQL
40
statements. Ravel pre-defines a network base (i.e., stored base tables) that capture the data plane, including
topology, forwarding behavior, and traffic (§ 3.4). Using SQL queries over this base, Pyretic functions and
PGA graphs become relations with schemas that capture the function domain, codomain, and graph entities,
respectively. To capture Kinetic state automata, we first create a relation whose schema fits the automata
states, and then augment the relation with triggers that simulate state transitions. Note that while the
Pyretic view is built using SQL queries directly from the base tables, PGA and Kinetic views are queries
over the Pyretic view. In general, application views are used as normal base tables, meaning each application
enriches the set of data that can be used to create new abstractions.
Orchestration
While vertical orchestration with existing techniques requires a variety of disparate runtimes, in Ravel it
is handled by the unifying view mechanism. As shown in Figure 3.1 (right), the two separated compilation
processes from the PGA graph and Kinetic automata to Pyretic are reduced in Ravel to view updates. Here,
changes on a higher-level PGA/Kinetic view are pushed down to the lower-level Pyretic view. Updates to the
Pyretic view are translated to those on the base tables. A key challenge in Ravel is horizontal orchestration
that involves multiple interacting controls, a scenario unusual in traditional database. For example, to
coordinate PGA and Kinetic policy changes, Ravel needs to coordinate the corresponding view updates. To
this end, Ravel enhances the database with a mediation protocol that refines the runtime execution in a
manner that the underlying network only transitions between consistent states (§ 3.5).
3.3 System Architecture
Figure 3.2 shows the main components of Ravel: the users, the Ravel runtime, and the network. The
network includes the services and resources being controlled. The users include network operators and a
Ravel administrator that interact with the network via the view interface. The Ravel administrator can
modify the behavior of Ravel, such as enriching the control abstractions by adding new views, or changing
the orchestration behavior (i.e., the database execution model) by adding new protocols. These interactions
all take the form of normal SQL statements: queries, updates, and triggers.
The main body of Ravel is the runtime, which sits in the middle between the users and the network.
It is the engine that enables multiple controls to jointly drive the network. The runtime consists of two
components. The database component interfaces with the users and is the brain that controls the variety
































































Figure 3.2: Ravel overview
updates) and external network events (e.g., control messages and network changes).
The database runtime operates on a set of tables — the pre-defined base tables (§ 3.4) and a hierarchy of
user-defined control application views. The base tables interact with the network runtime via SQL triggers
and with users via SQL queries and updates. The database runtime offer two services: vertical orchestration
that executes individual application control, and horizontal orchestration that coordinates these executions.
Vertical orchestration is implemented using a view mechanism. View maintenance automatically refreshes
application views, while view updates translate application updates to network controls. Modern databases
are capable of automatic view update for simple cases. For complicated scenarios that involve ambiguity
(e.g., a reachability view update corresponds to multiple viable path assignments in a lower base table), the
operator can direct the database via a trigger before deployment, or alter the trigger behavior at runtime.
Horizontal orchestration is implemented using a mediation protocol. The protocol assumes a priority
ordering among the control applications. Upon an initial control request that attempts to modify the base
data, the protocol consults all higher ranked applications that are affected, allowing them to check the
proposed update and make modifications according to its local logic. The resulting updates are combined
and populated back to the lower ranked applications. Finally, the orchestrated updates are grouped into a
transaction committed to the base tables.
The network runtime is controlled via database triggers. Database updates that result in changes to
switch flow tables invoke an OpenFlow manager (via a SQL trigger) that pushes the change to the network.
Changes to network state, such as the removal of a link, are passed on to the database through this manager.
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3.4 Abstractions
Shared Network State: The Base Tables
Ravel takes the entire network under the hood of a standard relational database, where the network
states and control configurations are organized in two levels. At the lower level is the tables storing the
shared network state and at the higher-level is the virtual views pertaining to each application. We consider
the network tables as part of the base. Ravel pre-defines the network base — a set of stored database tables
— based on our extensive study of state-of-the-art control applications. The base table schema design is as
follows:
tp(sid,nid) # topology
rm(fid,sid,nid,vol) # end-to-end reachability (matrix)
cf(fid,sid,nid) # configuration (forwarding table)
tp is the topology table that stores link pairs (sid,nid). rm is the end-to-end reachability matrix that
specifies for each flow (fid) the reachability (from sid to nid) and bandwidth (vol) information. cf is the
flow table that stores for each flow (fid) the flow entries (i.e., the next hop nid for the switch sid). All
attributes are symbolic identifiers with integer type for performance. For each attribute, Ravel keeps an
auxiliary table that maps to real-world identifiers (e.g., an IP prefix for sid and nid in cf).
Ravel’s base tables provide fast network access and updates while hiding the packet processing details.
They interact directly with the underlying network via OpenFlow. Initially, the base is loaded with the
network configurations (e.g., topology, flow tables). As the network changes, the Ravel runtime updates the
base (e.g., switches, links) accordingly. Similarly, as the base entries for flow rules change due to network
control produced by the application, the runtime sends the corresponding control messages to the network.
Application-Specific Policy: SQL Views
While the shared base talks continuously to the network, a separate higher-level permits abstraction
pertaining to individual applications. By running SQL queries on the base, SQL views derive the data
relevant to individual applications from the base, and restructure that data in a form that best suits the
application’s logic. SQL views allow a non-expert to add abstractions on demand, and the resulting views
are immediately usable — referenced and updated via the database system runtime (§ 3.5). This frees users
from committing to a fixed “right model that fits all”, thus making Ravel abstractions ad-hoc extensible as
requirements change or evolve.
For example, a load balancer abstraction is a view lb defined by the following SQL query.
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CREATE VIEW lb AS (
SELECT nid AS sid,
count(*) AS load
FROM rm
WHERE nid IN server_list);
SQL views are also composable, like function composition via procedure call. A composite view is built
by a query that references other views. In a SQL query, views are indistinguishable from normal tables.
Imagine a tenant network managed via view tenant policy as follows:
CREATE VIEW tenant_policy AS (
SELECT * FROM rm
WHERE host1 IN (SELECT * FROM tenant_hosts) AND
host2 IN (SELECT * FROM tenant_hosts));
tenant policy monitors all traffic pertaining to the tenant slice. To manage load in this slice, we can
build a composite view tlb from tenant policy, just like lb is built from the base rm:




WHERE host2=sid) AS load
FROM tlb_tb);
Control Loop: Monitoring and Repairing Policy Violations with Rules/Triggers
SDN application dynamics typically follow a control loop: the application monitors (reads) the network
state against its constraints, performs some computation, and modifies (writes) the network state according
to its policy. For example, a load balancer checks traffic on servers of concern and re-balances traffic when
an overload occurs (i.e., the load on a server exceeds a threshold t).
Ravel allows a natural translation of application policy as integrity constraints over view data and the
control loop that maintains the policy as SQL rule processing, in the form:
ON event DO action WHERE condition
For the load balancer, its invariant is a simple constraint load < threshold (t) over lb. Thus, we
monitor the violations with a query on lb against this constraint:
CREATE VIEW lb_violation AS (
SELECT * FROM lb WHERE load >= t);
To repair violations, we simply empty the lb violation view with a DELETE operation on lb violation.
We introduce the rule lb repair to translate the repair onto the actual operations on lb, which simply sets
the load to the default threshold:
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CREATE RULE lb_repair AS
ON DELETE TO lb_violation
DO ALSO (
UPDATE lb SET load=t WHERE sid=OLD.sid);
Another example action is to move two units of flow away from a particular server with id k:
UPDATE lb
SET load = (SELECT load FROM lb WHERE sid=k) - 2
WHERE sid=server_id;
3.5 Orchestration
3.5.1 Vertical Orchestration via View Mechanisms
Vertical orchestration is concerned with synchronizing the views and base by leveraging two view mech-
anisms. View mechanisms power view-based network control on individual applications: view maintenance
populates base dynamics to the views, and view update translates view updates to the base. View mainte-
nance is well-established, with a family of fast incremental algorithms developed over a decade [107, 48, 47].
Ravel implements classic view maintenance algorithms [48, 47] that automatically optimize application views
for faster access (described in § 3.8 and § 3.9.1). An interesting use of view maintenance is that an appli-
cation can ask interesting questions (e.g., a summary or aggregate) by submitting a SQL query on its view.
For example, to find overloaded servers exceeding some threshold t, an application can use the query:
SELECT sid FROM lb WHERE load > t;
Conversely, view update pushes the changes on the view back to the base. That is, changes requested
by the application are propagated to the network via this mechanism. [View update is a difficult and open
research problem [60, 18, 23] because an update may correspond to multiple translations on the underlying
base. To disambiguate, Ravel relies on user input for an update policy. For example, consider an update on
lb that re-balances traffic to randomly-chosen, lightly-selected servers. Specified by the following actions, it
reduces the load on a server from OLD.load to NEW.load by picking a server with lowest load and redirecting
the OLD.load-NEW.load oldest flows in rm to that server.
UPDATE rm
SET nid =
(SELECT sid FROM lb
WHERE load = (SELECT min (load)
FROM lb LIMIT (OLD.load - NEW.load))
LIMIT 1)
WHERE fid IN
(SELECT fid FROM rm WHERE nid = NEW.sid
LIMIT (OLD.load - NEW.load));
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In general, users can program an update policy with rules of the form:
CREATE RULE view2table AS
ON UPDATE TO view
DO INSTEAD UPDATE TABLE --- actions ---
Here, action can be an arbitrary sequence of SQL statements, or a procedure call to external heuristics.
This has the benefit of making Ravel abstractions open. Users can dynamically control the implementation
of its high-level policy — how the view update maps to the underlying network — by simply creating or
modifying the associated rules.
Similar to views derived directly from the base tables, nested views can be updated to manage the
underlying network states. The update policy only needs to specify how changes on the view are mapped
to its immediate source. For example, tlb only needs an update policy on tenant policy, from which it is
derived, and tenant policy will handle the mapping down to the network base tables.
CREATE RULE tlb2tenant_policy AS
ON UPDATE TO tlb
DO INSTEAD
UPDATE tenant_policy ...;
3.5.2 Horizontal Orchestration via Mediation Protocol
Eventually, all control application operations are translated to updates on the network base data. To
integrate the individual controls into a consistent base, it is sufficient to control their updates on the shared
base. To this end, Ravel enhances the database runtime with a mediation protocol that instructs the shared
data access.
The mediation protocol offers participating applications three primitive operations. i) Propose: an
application attempts a tuple insertion, deletion, or update to its view. ii) Receive: an application observes
updates (i.e., side-effects) reflected on its application view due to network updates initiated by another
participant. iii) Reconcile: an application checks the received view updates against its policy and performs
either accept (no violation), overwrite (to resolve a conflict), or reject (no conflict resolution exists). Conflict
occurs when updates made by one application violate the constraints of another. Ravel adopts a simple
conflict resolution policy based on priorities. Applications are required to provide a global ranking among
all the constraints, and one application can have multiple constraints. Higher-ranked constraints can then
overwrite updates from lower-ranked constraints if a conflict occurs.
Starting from a consistent network state where all application policies (i.e., invariants) are satisfied, the
protocol takes an proposed update and a globally agreed upon priority list, producing a set of orchestrated
updates as follows. First, Ravel computes the effects of the proposal on other applications. A view up-
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date affects another view if the corresponding update on the shared data item causes modification to that
view. Next, the affected applications sequentially reconcile their received update against their constraints
in increased ranks. Finally, all reconciled updates are merged and form the orchestrated output set. The
orchestrated output is applied atomically as one transaction in the database, which transforms the network
from its current state to the next.
Correctness
Ravel orchestration handles two scenarios. In one, applications are called to collaborate for a common
task (e.g., when a firewall drops an unsafe path, the routing component shall be invoked to remove the
corresponding path). In the other, independent applications are prevented from inadvertently affecting
each other (e.g., traffic engineering and device maintenance). Combined, the goal is to avoid partial and
conflicting updates that lead a network into an inconsistent state. Formally, a network state is consistent
if it is compliant with all the application policies. That is, consistent network states correspond to (derive)
applications with invariant-preserving views. A set of network updates potentially contributed by multiple
applications is correctly orchestrated if the set transforms a consistent (i.e., correct) network state into only
another consistent states.
Proposition 3.1. Ravel orchestration preserves network consistency.
Proof. (Sketch) The data mediating protocol translates each application update into a set of updates (con-
tributed by all relevant applications) which, combined, satisfy all application constraints (subject to conflict
resolution), thus preserving network consistency.
3.6 Guiding Orchestration with Dependency Reasoning
Next, we extend our notion of orchestration and build on logic reasoning to automatically synthesize
part of the control logic when composing applications. The modular design of SDN — where multiple
control modules collectively realize all management objectives — still requires an operator to understand a
member module’s internals to determine the event-level interactions in all execution runs. To address this
challenge, we characterize the composition problem as a data integration problem of merging data sources
into an integrated whole. We use this formulation to introduce dependency reasoning, which provides a
logical characterization of the finer-grained interactions between control modules. These interactions, or
dependency relations, include: independence; dependence, where one control module requires further action
from another; and codependence, where divergence, conflicts, and refinement to dependent cases can occur.
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By building on database irrelevance reasoning, Ravel can automate dependency reasoning by reducing
it to a satisfiability problem. Ravel also extends prior satisfiability formulations to include aggregates,
which provides useful networking semantics (e.g., count for load balancer). The extension is inspired by a
novel rewriting technique, inspired by incremental view maintenance, that transforms an aggregate into an
incrementally maintained “normal” function [48].
In addition to supporting SDN management at design phase — when a preset control logic based on
domain knowledge is assumed [42, 78] — we extend Ravel to existing controller implementations with a pure
syntactic translation. Without requiring additional user annotations, Ravel automatically extracts the formal
model for automatic dependency reasoning, and maps the output logic back to the original platform. We
use the Pyretic platform as an example: we formally identify a core sub-language of Pyretic, and recursively
build the mapping between Pyretic objects, the Ravel model, and the output logic.
3.6.1 Motivating Examples
Automating Pyretic Composition
To keep up with the complexity of SDN management, it is generally agreed that modular programming
with high-level network objects plays a key role. While [78, 44] provide excellent high-level modular plat-
forms, they do not enforce a clean module-level composition interface. For example, the simple case [78] of
a firewall (afw) and load balancer (alb) requires the operator to foresee the subtle difference in composition
(afw>>alb versus alb>>afw):
fwlb = if_(from_client, afw >> alb, alb >> afw)
An operator will need to correctly identify the composition patterns that correspond to all possible
executions, which often depend on the traffic being processed. Thus, the correct composition, or master
program, still relies on the operator’s understanding of the internals of each individual module and the
finer-grained, “beneath-module” interactions. [87] calls this the “decompose and re-compose” problem, and
shows that additional requirements can quickly add complexity 1.
To this end, Ravel aims to synthesize a correct composition by automatic, yet finer-grained dependency
reasoning. The challenge is to find a syntactic translation that automatically extracts a formal model from
a Pyretic program and converts the reasoning result back to Pyretic composition.
1In fact, this motivates PGA [87] to automate composition of static service chains
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Preventing Security Violations
While SDN enables flexible programmable control, it also presents a security challenge. Malicious or
innocent-but-careless users can inject controller programs that breach security. Consider a firewall that blocks
communication between (h1, s1), dropping packet with header (src : h1, dst : s1). A rewriting program that
combines two seemingly legitimate rules (h1, s2) → (h2, s2) and (h2, s2) → (h2, s1) will breach the firewall,
allowing traffic flow from h1 (with header (h1, s2)) to s1. FortNOX [86] formulates such security breaches
as OpenFlow rule conflicts, and introduces an alias set to detect the conflicts through runtime checking
of OpenFlow rule updates. Like other runtime efforts, FortNOX is postmortem and requires exhaustively
checking every update. More importantly, FortNOX, which operates on low-level OpenFlow rules, does not
understand higher-level control logic. Thus, for a particular detected breach, FortNOX cannot shed light on
the problematic control module.
To this end, Ravel aims to prevent security breaches via logic reasoning on the interactions between
controller programs. The strength of Ravel is the performance gained by non-exhaustive static analysis and
the ability to reveal the conflicting control logic prior to deployment. The challenge is to fold the alias set
into automatic dependency reasoning.
Synthesizing Content-based Dynamic Policies
To extend the SDN paradigm to full-featured middleboxes, the FlowTags system [42] introduces a tag-
extension that realizes complex middleboxes policies. However, the correct interaction among middleboxes
can be tricky. For example, between a group of internal hosts and some external server, one may want
to place a proxy and a firewall. The proxy improves host experience by caching server contents for faster
responses, while the firewall controls communication between the host and the server. The subtlety is that
the proxy has to take into account the decisions of the firewall, otherwise a to-be-blocked host might still
be able access the data in the proxy which is previously cached by a legal host. FlowTags assumes a preset
specification — a dynamic policy graph (DPG) — that correctly recognizes such subtle context-dependent
dynamic interactions2.
To this end, Ravel aims to synthesize a DPG that correctly knits together the middleboxes. The key
challenge in doing so is synthesizing the context-based dynamic dependency.
2Automatic generation of DPG specification is described as future work of FlowTags.
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3.6.2 Composition as a Data Integration Problem
To tackle this application composition problem in SDN, we argue we can formulate many network man-
agement tasks as data integration problems of merging data sources into an integrated whole. In our
formulation, the entire network is stored as relational data. We assign distinct roles, where the control
applications serve as the individual data sources that produce network data, and the data plane becomes
the integrated whole.
Data integration [68, 95, 69] examines the problem of combining data from a variety of sources to form
a new, unified whole. More formally, a data integration system is defined as I = 〈G,S,M〉, with a global
schema G, semantic mappings M, and data sources S. The system exposes to users a single and coherent
interface, through a mediated global schema G. Users can query and access data from local sources while the
system hides the details and inconsistencies of the constituting sources. Semantic mappings M specify the
relationship between the schemas of the data sources S and the global schema G. The semantic mappings
allow answering queries over G using queries over S. We consider data sources that are relational.
There are two approaches to (virtual) data integration, which differ in the way M is defined: global-as-
view (GAV) and local-as-view (LAV). In GAV, the global tables are defined in terms of the local tables.
Each global table is thus a view of the local tables. In LAV, M is defined in a somewhat dual manner: the
local tables are defined in terms of the global tables. Hence, each local table is a view of the global tables.
An important problem in a data integration system is the reconciliation of inconsistencies between the
data sources. Inconsistencies are captured by integrity constraints that specify what data instances are
acceptable. Integrity constraints can be specified directly over the global schema, or expressed on the indi-
vidual sources and eventually expanded and unfolded on the global schema. The constraints can accelerate
data access (i.e., reads) in a read-dominant I, but they deteriorate I’s performance when faced with frequent
updates (i.e., writes) due to the overhead of checking the integrity constraints.
In SDN, we define network integration as the problem of enabling multiple independently created, poten-
tially overlapping and/or conflicting control applications to collectively drive a network in a coherent manner.
Using Ravel, where the entire network state (i.e., the control applications and data plane) is modeled as
relational data, we can cast this problem to a data integration problem and define a network integration
system as IN = 〈GN ,SN ,MN 〉. The global schema GN , augmented with integrity constraints, character-
izes a consistent data plane. The source schemas SN describe network states contributed by independently
operated control applications. The goal of network integration is to find a mapping MN that synchronizes
between the control applications’ states and the network data plane under the integrity constraints.
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3.6.3 Behavioral Model
The intended behavior of a task is governed by the control logic of the corresponding module. Depending
on the nature and development stage of the task, an operator may use different control abstractions to
describe or program the task. For a basic forwarding task, Pyretic [78] offers a functional abstraction
that enables modular programming. For a stateful task with correctness requirements, Kinetic [63] offers
a verifiable language construct based on state machines. Though seemingly different, the behavior of most
control modular follows a common pattern: a continuous control loop of monitoring network states, followed
by performing a local computation, and then reconfiguring the network.
We make one further abstraction. Let the requirement (i.e., intention) of the task be denoted by some
invariants, captured by a collection of violation views. Conceptually the local computation will serve two
roles: measuring the network state to detect invariant violations; and reconfiguring the network to repair
any violations. Thus, we model a control unit — an cycle of measuring and reconfiguring one invariant —
by a pair of datalog-like rules q, r.
q v(X’,Y’,...) :- net1(X), net2(Y),..., vc(X,Y,...,Z)
r u_i(X’) :- v(X,Y,...), uc(X,Y,...,X’);
u_d(Y’) :- v(X,Y,...), uc(X,Y,...,Y’); ...
The q rule tests the network states net against violation condition vc, outputting the violation view v.
X,Y,... are vectors of network attributes, and Z is the module-specific attributes3. The r rule computes
network reconfigurations, i.e., updates (either an insertion ’u i’ or a deletion ’u d’) to net tables that will
restore the violation view to empty.
For example, the behavioral model for the previously discussed firewall module is as follows. The q rule
says a flow in rm is violating the firewall policy if its source and destination (src,dst) match the local
computation (block). The r rule models the violation repair, which removes rm rows that are detected in
the violation view fw v.
q fw_v(fid) :- rm(fid,src,dst), block(src,dst)
r rm_d(fid,src,dst):- fw_v(fid)
Complete Model and Assumptions
Definition 3.1 (Network Model). A network collectively driven by a set of management tasks is a 5-tuple
(N,V, U, q, r), where N is a finite set of network tables, V is a finite set of violation views, U is a finite set
of update tables to N , q = {qk|qk : N → vk, vk ∈ V } is the measuring rules, and r = {rk|rk : vK × N →
uk, vk ∈ V ∧ uk ∈ U} is the reconfiguring rules.
3Technically, rule q joins net and vc, and selects rows in net that fail the test (condition vc)
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A snapshot of the network state is denoted by the tuple (N,V, U). As the management module measures
and reconfigures the network, the network state evolves. A sequence of network states is called an execution
run. A network is consistent if it is compliant with all invariants, i.e., when ∀vk ∈ V, vk = ∅. As shown
in Figure 3.3 (left), we call the individual set (qk, vk, rk, uk) that continuously measures and reconfigures
the network a control unit. In general, a control module can involve multiple distinct control units. For
example, a NAT module may contain two units, one for traffic arriving on the public face and one for the
private face.
We make two assumptions when a module involves multiple control units. First, the invariants that
define each control unit’s violation view are disjoint. Second, for any two control units i, j in the same
module, a reconfiguration by one (ui) will not introduce new violations to another (vj). Thus, we assume
each module is capable of partitioning and organizing its concerns into disjoint and coherent control units.
However, control units across modules can overlap and contradict, resulting in complex interactions.
3.6.4 Automated Reasoning
Consider the management tasks described in § 3.6.1. Despite their apparent differences — diverse abstrac-
tion constructs (functions, graphs, rules), different stages in development (design, implementation, runtime),
and the varying nature (forwarding, middleboxes, security) — the recurring theme is the search for a correct
control logic that maintains network consistency.
The challenge is that the control units across the modules are collectively driving the same shared network,
and exhibit finer-grained complex interactions. Our goal is to formally characterize and statically determine




As illustrated in Figure 3.3 (right), suppose we have two control units x = (qk, vk, rk, uk) and y =
(qy, vy, ry, uy). We use the term active to describe a control unit when its violation view is nonempty. A
control unit is active if the network is in an inconsistent state that violates its invariant. We say the control
unit x activates y, denoted by x→ y, if in some network states, the network updates contributed by ux can
cause changes to vy, potentially introducing new violations to y. We say x does not activate y, denoted by
x 6→ y, if in all network states, reconfigurations from x leave vy unchanged. When x activates y (x→ y), we













































Figure 3.3: Formal model (left) of a control unit that measures and reconfigures the network. Logical
characterization and detection (right) of dependency relations between the control units
reconfiguration (i.e., the application of qx and rx that produces vx and ux). An execution of x will repair
any network inconsistency with regard to x, but may activate other control units. We use Jx→ yK to denote
the set of network states where ux always changes vy.
Independence and Dependence
Definition 3.2 (Independence relation). x is independent of y if x 6→ y and y 6→ x.
The independence relation is symmetric: if x is independent of y, y is also independent of x. When two
independent units x, y are both active, we can execute x and y independently without additional coordination.
Control units in the same module are always independent of each other based on our assumptions. If we
have the additional knowledge that the controls units from different modules are also independent, the entire
control logic can safely execute in parallel, while preserving overall network consistency.
Definition 3.3 (Dependence relation). x depends on y if x→ y and y 6→ x.
The dependence relation is asymmetric. When x depends on y, additional coordination is needed to
maintain management consistency. On one hand, even if the inconsistency only concerns x (i.e., only x is
active), executing x may still trigger and require further actions from y. Thus, we also need to execute y to
take into account y’s reconfiguration. On the other hand, when the inconsistency concerns both x, y (i.e., x
and y are both active), if we execute y prior to x, the latter reconfiguration by x can trigger actions of y the
second time, potentially overwriting y’s earlier actions. Thus, if x → y, it is better to execute in the order
of x, y.
In general, for the set of control units from two modules, if the units form an independence relation
and/or a set of acyclic dependence relations, we can deterministically schedule their execution, defining
an execution plan that is guaranteed to restore overall network consistency by executing each control unit




Definition 3.4 (Codependence relation). x and y are codependent if x→ y and y → x.
The codependence relation is symmetric. The coordination of two codependent control units x, y is more
difficult. We identify and address three special cases. Case 1 assumes that we observe x→ y and y → x on
disjoint sets of network states. Formally, Jx → yK ∩ Jy → xK = ∅. In this case, we can always reduce the
codependent x, y into two pairs of dependent control units. Without loss of generality, we can break x into
xa, xb, where xa is the restriction of x on Jx → yK) and xb is the restriction of x on Jy → xK). Obviously,
xa → y and y → xb. Thus, we call this the false-codependence case. Case 2 assumes that an inconsistency
that activates both x, y can be repaired by either x or y. That is, x, y each concern some aspect of an
inconsistent network. Executing x (y) can also repair the violation on y (x). We call this the divergence
case as the final network state depends on which of x, y is executed. Finally, Case 3 assumes that x, y can
form some execution loop, where an execution of x activates y, which further activates x, and so forth. That
is, the execution loop can be infinite. We call this the conflicting case as the execution loop is caused by
conflicting control logic.
In the false-codependence case, we can first reduce the control units to some dependence relations and
coordinate them accordingly. In the divergence case, we can pick an execution from a preset prioritization
of control units. Note that this is more finer-grained and flexible than a rigid module-level priority. In the
conflicting case, however, we cannot find an execution plan that is guaranteed to restore overall network
consistency without looking closer at and altering the control logic themselves.
3.6.6 Satisfiability Reasoning
We now describe how to automatically determine the dependency relations by only examining the logical
rules that define the control units. The challenge is that a dependency relation, by definition, is a dynamic
property over all execution runs. Our contribution is to reduce the checking of such runtime property to a
static decision problem called irrelevance update [22, 70, 38].
By definition, the dependency relations (independence, dependency, codependency) can be decided by
checking x →? y and y →? x. Imagine that we store all the network tables and views in a database, the
network reconfiguration ux is nothing but a database update, and the violation view vy a regular database
derived view. As a result, x 6→ y is reduced to checking, for all possible database states, if the update ux
will ever change the derived view vy. This is called the irrelevant update problem in database research: ux
is said to be irrelevant to vy if the update will not affect vy for any database instances. Otherwise, update
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ux is said to be relevant to vy.
Proposition 3.2 (dependency and (ir)relevance). x 6→ y (x → y) iff ux is irrelevant (relevant) to vy
respectively.
Figure 3.3 illustrates how to decide the dependency relation by automatic (ir)relevance reasoning. We
leverage prior work [22, 70, 38] that formulates (ir)relevance reasoning as a satisfiability problem. Our goal
is to decide (ir)relevance between ux and vy by static analysis of rx (i.e., the reconfiguring program that
generates ux) and qy (i.e., the measuring program that generates vy).
Proposition 3.3 ((ir)relevance reasoning as satisfiability). If ux = t, ux is (ir)relevant to vy if and only if
vcy(t) is (un)satisfiable. If ux = {t|ucx(t)}, ux is (ir)relevant to vy if and only if ucx∧vcy is (un)satisfiable.
Recall that, as formalized in § 3.6.4 in rx, ux is either an insertion of a tuple t, or a deletion of tuples
{t|ucx(t)} that violates x’s update condition ucx. qy generates vcy by running a local violation check ucx
on the network.
Extensions for Aggregates
Prior work focuses on irrelevant updates where the derived views are built from standard operations
(select, join, projects, or the datalog equivalent), leaving out important aggregate operations, such as MIN,
MAX, AVG, COUNT. However, these aggregates offer useful semantics for network management. For example,
a load balancer needs COUNT in its logic. Formally, an aggregate is a function f : G→ a that maps a group
of values (G) to a new value (a), and by definition, depends on every elements in G.
The challenge is that if the invariant condition vcy involves an aggregate over a group, and the updates
t (insertion) / ucx(deletion) belong to that group, the information in t / ucx will not be sufficient to decide
the new aggregate value of the group. Thus, we will not have sufficient information to deduce the truth
value of vcy(t) / ucx ∧ vcy.
We overcome this by borrowing ideas from incremental view maintenance [48]. Incremental view mainte-
nance computes a view’s new value by only looking at the old value and the change to the database. When
the view is defined by aggregates, the key idea is to rewrite the aggregate function into an incremental one
that avoids referencing every element in the group: f(G) = a in the above becomes f ′(G ∪ δ) = f ′(a, δ).
Formally, f(G ∪ δ) = f ′(f(G), δ). For example, count will be rewritten to f ′(G ∪ δ) = count(G) + |δ|. The
occurrence of the aggregate f in the predicate vcy is then replaced by the f




A ::= drop | modify(h=v)
Predicates:
P ::= all packets | no packets |
match(h=v) | P&P | (P|P) | P
Policies:
C ::= A | P[C] | (C | C) | C >> C
Figure 3.4: Pyretic sub-language amenable to reasoning
Pyretic Predicate Violation View Condition
match(h=v) fid FROM rm WHERE h=v
P & P fid FROM rm WHERE P AND P
P | P fid FROM rm WHERE P OR P
all packets fid FROM rm
Pyretic Action Repair Update
drop DROP fid FROM rm
modify(h=v) UPDATE rm SET h=v
Table 3.1: Summary of Pyretic translation
3.6.7 Syntactic Translation
In our proof of concept, we demonstrate extracting a model amenable to reasoning from Pyretic [78]
policies. We examine a subset of the Pyretic language for defining static policies, shown in Figure 3.4. We
chose this subset as we can express a large range of static policies (e.g., for firewall and NAT applications),
with the intuition that most policies can be expressed in the form P >> A. We leave extracting dynamic and
query policies to future work.
For example, suppose we have a firewall policy that blocks flows between hosts 10.0.0.1 and 10.0.0.2, and
a NAT policy that specifies flows with source IPs 10.0.0.3 and 10.0.0.4 should be rewritten to 10.0.0.11. The
resulting policy can be expressed in Pyretic as:
# firewall
(match(srcip=10.0.0.1) & match(dstip=10.0.0.2)) |
(match(srcip=10.0.0.2) & match(dstip=10.0.0.1)) >> drop
# nat
(match(srcip=10.0.0.3) | match(srcip=10.0.0.4)) >>
modify(srcip=10.0.0.11)
The model we extract from a Pyretic policy operates on Ravel’s base schema design. Thus, a Pyretic
match predicate on a flow’s source IP address translates to a query over flow table rm that matches the




When analyzing a Pyretic application, we use the existence of the location for a rule to define local and
global rules. Global rules impose constraints across all flows, while local rules impose constraints only on
rules installed in a given switch. Therefore, a policy that does not specify a location for a rule becomes a
global rule. Global policies query rm (the network-wide reachability matrix), while local rules query cf (the
per-switch configuration matrix).
Following our formal model, the extracted Pyretic model must specify violations of the policy’s con-
straints, as well as a set of repair actions. Pyretic predicates (and combinations of predicates) define
violations, while actions define repairs. We model violations as a SQL view (equivalent to datalog rules in
§ 3.6.3) on rm and cf. Table 3.1 shows our translation process, where the violation view condition defines the
query for violating flows, and the repair update defines the update to rm or cf. For example, a drop action
for a given node or flow implies an entry in a blacklist, so a drop action on a given predicate entails the
absence of flows in rm for that pair of nodes. Repairing the violation is a matter of removing the violating
flow fid from rm. We repeat this process recursively for each match-action term.
Once the reasoning engine analyzes the Pyretic model, we can use the result to compose the Pyretic
applications. For an application x that is dependent on y, we compose the two sequentially as y >> x.
Otherwise, applications that are not dependent on each other can be composed in parallel as x|y.
3.7 Example Ravel Applications
We present a full implementation of an example network consisting of a simplified PGA service chain
application, a simplified Kinetic stateful firewall, and the orchestration facility that combines them. The
disparately different PGA and Kinetic paradigms fit naturally into Ravel’s SQL statements: tables, views,
and rules. We also give an example of priority assignment, and the automatically generated orchestration
implementation. In addition to providing a lightweight alternative to present systems like PGA and Kinetic,
Ravel does not rely on application-specific constructs or optimization tuning.
3.7.1 (PGA) Service Chain Policies for Groups
Specifying Control Policy
In Ravel, the PGA graph expressions for service chain policies on sub-domains are two plain tables:
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CREATE TABLE sub_domain (
gid integer,
eid integer);




sub domain(gid, eid) reads as a membership statement that an endpoint eid (i.e., any individual
address) belongs to group gid. service chain(gid1, gid2, MB) specifies the middlebox to be traversed
for the two groups gid1, gid2. To merge the group-level service chain policies into those for individual
endpoints, PGA employs an integrated specialized algorithm that involves two key steps. The first, graph
composition, computes the policy over the individual endpoints. Next, middlebox ordering analyzes mid-
dlebox dependencies and merges multiple ones into a single chain with heuristics. Ravel also splits merging
into two steps: i) generating the composition endpoint-level policy with a three line query as follows, and
ii) determining an ordering using a mediation protocol (§ 3.5.2). What is unique to Ravel is that the two
steps are separated and each relies on a generic application-agnostic technique.
CREATE VIEW service_chain_composite AS(
SELECT DISTINCT sd1.eid as eid1, sd2.eid as eid2, MB
FROM sub_domain sd1, sub_domain sd2, service_chain
WHERE sd1.gid=gid1 AND sd2.gid=gid2);
This query states that we have an endpoint-level service chain service chain composite(sid1, sid2,
MB) if the two endpoints belong to groups and there is a corresponding group-level service chain. While
PGA improves graph composition performance with specialized heuristics drawn on novel insights, Ravel
relies on standard view maintenance algorithm to accelerate access.
Control Loop: Monitoring and Repairing Violations
To detect violations of the service chain policy, we simply query service chain composite(sid1, sid2,
MB) against the underlying network reachability in rm.
CREATE VIEW sc_violation AS (
SELECT fid, MB
FROM rm, service_chain_composite
WHERE src=eid1 AND dst=eid2 AND (MB=’FW’ AND FW=0));
A violation occurs if for some endpoint pairs (eid1, eid2), service chain composite requires a way-
point through a middlebox (MB=’FW’) that is not respected by rm (FW=0). The query also extracts the flow
(fid) in the violation. To repair a violation, we simply delete rows in sc violation. The delete operation
is translated onto the underlying rm by rule sc repair, which simply sets rm’s FW value to 1.
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CREATE RULE sc_repair AS
ON DELETE TO sc_violation
DO INSTEAD
UPDATE rm SET FW=1
WHERE fid=OLD.fid AND OLD.MB=’FW’;
3.7.2 (Kinetic) Stateful Firewall
Specifying Control Policy
In Ravel, a stateful firewall policy (§ 3.2) comprises two tables: FW white(eid1, eid2) denotes the end-
point pair (eid1, eid2) that is allowed to communicate (i.e., the whitelist), and the user table FW in(eid)
stores internal endpoints whose in-bound traffic is allowed only after they first initiate an out-bound request.
To capture this dynamic, we add two rules: FW1 modifies the whitelist to allow in-bound routes in response
to a request, and FW2 disallows an outdated in-bound routes.
CREATE TABLE FW_white (
end1 integer,
end2 integer);
CREATE TABLE FW_in (
uid integer);
CREATE RULE FW1 AS
ON INSERT TO rm
WHERE ((NEW.src, NEW.dst) NOT IN
(SELECT end2, end1 FROM FW_white)) AND
(NEW.src IN (SELECT * FROM FW_in))
DO ALSO (INSERT INTO FW_white VALUES (NEW.dst, NEW.src););
CREATE OR REPLACE RULE FW2 AS
ON DELETE TO rm
WHERE (SELECT count(*)






Control Loop: Monitoring and Repairing Violations
Violations are detected by a query on rm that finds pairs that are not in the firewall whitelist, as stated
in FW violation. To repair the violation, we simply remove these pairs, as shown in rule FW repair.
59




(src, dst) NOT IN (SELECT end1, end2 FROM FW_white));
CREATE RULE FW_repair AS
ON DELETE TO FW_violation
DO INSTEAD
DELETE FROM rm WHERE fid=OLD.fid;
3.7.3 Putting It All Together: Orchestrating Service Chains and Firewall
Implementing the orchestration protocol using Ravel is straightforward with PostgreSQL triggers [83, 101,
33, 101]. Assuming a pre-assigned priority, Ravel automatically generates the orchestration implementation
consisting of two parts: triggers that register an application, and triggers that enforce an execution order
according to the priority.
Registering Applications in the Protocol
To register an application, Ravel binds it to an auxiliary table and a rule. As the protocol proceeds, the
table is set on and runs the application in the rule. For example, we bind to the firewall a table p FW and a
rule run FW. The table and rule generated for service chain is similar.
CREATE UNLOGGED TABLE p_FW (
counts integer,
status text);
CREATE RULE run_FW AS




UPDATE p_FW SET status=’off’
WHERE counts=NEW.counts);
Implementing the Protocol
To determine the priority among the service chain (SC), firewall (FW), and routing (RT) applications, we
analyze the view dependency among them. First, observe that both FW and SC updates will invoke RT to
install the corresponding change to network path. Hence, we assign RT the highest priority so it is always
called in the end to append the path-level data write needed to complete the updates. Second, SC will affect
FW. Consider a flow bypassing the firewall — if the flow is also forbidden by the firewall, an SC update that
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instructs the flow to traverse the firewall will cause fw violation. As such, we assign FW a higher rank so it
can repair the violation (e.g., drop the flow). Together, we have a priority list of [SC,FW,RT] (low to high).
To enforce priority, we only need to ensure an execution ordering of SC, FW, and RT. Ravel generates rules
PGA2FW, FW2RT, and RT2Fin to pass control along this ordering.
-- starts orchestration
INSERT INTO p_PGA VALUES (MAX_CLOCK_TICK, ’on’);
-- enforces an order of execution sequence
CREATE OR REPLACE RULE PGA2FW AS
ON UPDATE TO p_PGA
WHERE (NEW.status=’off’)
DO ALSO
INSERT INTO p_FW values (NEW.counts, ’on’);
CREATE OR REPLACE RULE FW2RT AS
ON UPDATE TO p_FW
WHERE (NEW.status=’off’)
DO ALSO
INSERT INTO p_RT values (NEW.counts, ’on’);
CREATE OR REPLACE RULE RT2Fin AS
ON UPDATE TO p_RT
WHERE (NEW.status=’off’)
DO ALSO
INSERT INTO clock values (NEW.counts);
3.8 Implementation
Our Ravel prototype is open source [1, 2]. It consists of two components: a PostgreSQL database runtime
and a network runtime.
3.8.1 Database Runtime
We chose PostgreSQL [12] as it is an advanced, open source database popular for both academic and
commercial purpose. It is highly customizable with useful features for networking (e.g., pgRouting [84]).
The database component is implemented in 1000+ lines of SQL, consisting of three subcomponents: the
network base, the control applications (routing, load balancer, access control, and tenants), and the runtime.
Table 3.2 summarizes the implementation size and the PostgreSQL features used.
During development of Ravel’s prototype, we learned two optimization tactics that reflect the time-space
trade-off in a database-centered system. First, Ravel optimizes the base table schemas to avoid recursive
path computation. By adding an additional reachability requirement table rm and triggers that recursively
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Ravel component Lines (#) Language/Feature
ap
p
routing (rt) 230 SQL, rule, trigger
load balancer (lb) 30 SQL, rule
access control (acl) 20 SQL, rule
tenant (rt, lb, acl) 130 SQL, rule, trigger
d
b network base 120 SQL





rk SQL trigger 100 SQL, trigger
Python trigger 300 Python, RPC, MQ
OpenFlow manager 1100 Python, flowmod
Table 3.2: Summary of Ravel components
reconfigure the corresponding paths on the per-switch configuration table, higher-level views can control
routing paths via non-recursive queries and updates over rm. Second, Ravel optimizes the performance
of application views by integrating a classic view maintenance algorithm [48], which avoids wasteful re-
computation of the views from scratch as the network changes.
3.8.2 Network Runtime
Ravel interacts with a physical SDN network via a network runtime implemented in 1700 lines of Python
and SQL code, summarized in Table 3.2. Figure 3.5 shows the high level architecture. The runtime consists
of two subcomponents: database triggers and an OpenFlow manager. Database triggers are invoked on
changes to flows (i.e., insertion, deletion, or modification). A trigger is invoked for each switch along the
flow’s path to update the switch’s flow table. The trigger queries the database for the flow’s match and
















Figure 3.5: Ravel network runtime architecture
We implemented three mechanisms for triggers to communicate with the OpenFlow manager: remote
procedure calls (RPC), message queues (MQ), and a wrapper around the ovs-ofctl [82] command. With
RPC, the OpenFlow manager can reside on a separate machine than the Postgres database. The OpenFlow
manager receives the flow entry from the database trigger and constructs a flow modification message. We
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use Pox [14] to send the OpenFlow messages to the appropriate switch. We also leverage Pox’s (LLDP-
based) discovery module to monitor changes to link states and update the database appropriately using
psycopg [88].
3.9 Evaluation
We evaluate Ravel under two scenarios. First, we present a comprehensive evaluation of the database
component, profiling and micro-benchmarking database overhead on all key operations: routing decision,
application orchestration, and control application optimizations. We demonstrate promising results, showing
Ravel’s database component scales gracefully to large network topologies and incurs small absolute delay
on moderate network size. Second, we evaluate Ravel on a physical SDN testbed, showing Ravel’s network
runtime can transform changes in the database to changes in a switch’s flow table within a few milliseconds.
3.9.1 Profiling Database Performance
As Ravel uses a database for network control and performance tuning, we first profiled the database
component overhead. Specifically, we microbenchmarked database operations for route insertion and deletion
on large fat-tree and ISP network topologies. Next, we examined scalability in orchestrating applications.
Finally, we evaluated the performance improvement from view optimizations. The results are promising: on
a fat-tree topology with 196608 links and 5120 switches, and the largest ISP topology (Rocketfuel dataset)
of 5939 switches and 16520 links, the delay for rule/trigger and key-value query overhead remained in the
single digit millisecond range. All experiments were run on a 64bit VM with a single-core CPU and 8GB
RAM.
Network Setup
We used the three fat-tree topologies and four ISP topologies (taken from the Rocketfuel [92] dataset)
shown in Figure 3.3. A fat-tree with k pods contains k core switches, k/2 aggregation switches, k/2 edge
switches, and k/2 hosts.
We used the smallest AS (4755), two moderate sized ASes (3356, 2914), and the largest AS (7018).
ASes 4755, 3356, and 7018 are used to study how Ravel operations scale as network size increases. AS 2914
is pre-populated with a policy configuration (i.e., forwarding rules) to study Ravel scalability against policy
size. We used Route Views [13] BGP feeds, each of which specifies a route to an external prefix collected
at a vantage point, to synthesize the policy as follows. Vantage points were mapped to a set of random AS
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fat-tree ISP
k switches links AS# nodes links
16 320 3072 4755 142 258
32 1280 24576 3356 1772 13640
64 5120 196608 7018 25382 11292
2914 5939 16520
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Figure 3.6: Sources of Ravel delay (ms) for route insertion and deletion
switches, which served as border routers for the AS. Next, the external prefixes were randomly assigned to
one of the borders. With these two mappings, each BGP feed was translated to a route between two border
routers, a route that carries traffic for the external prefix.
Profiling Delay
We started by profiling the primitive database operations that constitute Ravel delay: pgr routing (rt)
that computes a shortest path between two nodes, lookup ports (lk) that fetches the outgoing port, write
to table (wt) that installs the per-switch forwarding rules, and trigger and rules (tr) that optimize
application operations and coordinate their interactions. We found the delay is dominated by the routing
component (rt) and database writes (wt), which are dependent on the network topology. The additional
database overhead of lk and tr remains low even for large network sizes, demonstrating good scalability.
The details of the constituted delays are shown in Figure 3.6.
As the network size grows for fat-tree and ISP topologies, the delay caused by tr and wt operations
increases linearly. Even for fattree k=64, both operations only double to 5ms. While the path-computation
component rt grows and quickly dominates delay, it can easily be replaced by a faster implementation with
better heuristics or precomputing k-shortest paths. In contrast to network size, the growth of the policy size
has a smaller effect on the operations. This is because Ravel handles each flow fid independent of the rest
of the policy space. Therefore, the scalability study below examines only the network size.
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Scaling Orchestration
We measured, on increasing network sizes, Ravel’s delay in orchestrating applications, including a load
balancer (lb), access control (acl), tenant network (t), and routing application (rt). acl removes (i.e.,
prohibits) traffic requirements from a blacklist. lb re-balances traffic requirements among a list of provisioned
servers. rt is the component that actually realizes the traffic requirement with per-switch rules. Tenant
network t is a 10-node full-mesh network that controls the traffic slice pertaining to its topology.
We examined vertical and horizontal orchestration scenarios. We use x@t to denote vertical orchestration
of an application x controlling a tenant network t. For horizontal orchestration, we use x+y+... to denote
applications x,y,... collectively controlling a network. For example, lb+acl+rt denotes the scenario that
upon a newly inserted route, the load balancer is engaged first, followed by access control, and finally by
the routing application to set up the actual path on the underlying network state. The CDF in Figure 3.7
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Figure 3.7: CDF of orchestration delay: normalized per-rule orchestration delay (ms) on various network
sizes
We found that Ravel adds a small delay for orchestration, around 1ms for most scenarios. Delay is
dominated by rt because of its semantics. rt must compute the path and reconfigure switches. In contrast,
acl imposes a negligible delay (<1ms) since it must only read from its blacklist, i.e., a fast key-value lookup.
lb sits between these two applications and handles the extra path computation to direct traffic to a less




































Figure 3.8: (a) CDF of query time (ms) on a view and its materialized equivalent. (b,c) CDF of maintenance
delay (ms)
Optimizing Application Views
Ravel optimizes application views by translating them into equivalent materialized tables that offers
faster access with small overhead. Figure 3.8 (a) compares the performance (i.e., query delay) on a load
balancer view (v) and its materialized version (o) for three policy sizes (10,100,1000). Queries on optimized
views (blue lines) are one magnitude faster (0.1ms vs. 1-2ms). As policy size grows (from 10 to 1000), the
performance gain is more obvious. Figure 3.8 (b,c) shows the overhead of view maintenance, measured on
three fat-tree topologies (k=16,32,64) and two scenarios: updates (deletion and insertion) to lb tb and rm.
In all cases, view maintenance incurs small delay (single digit millisecond) that scales well to large network
size.
3.9.2 Physical Testbed Evaluation
We evaluated Ravel on a physical SDN testbed with Pica8 Pronto 3290 switches. Average round-trip
time between the controller and switches is <0.5ms.
First, we examined sources of delay in the network runtime by profiling the database triggers and Open-
Flow manager during flow insertion, deletion, and rerouting for a five-hop path. We used message queues
(MQ) for communication between the triggers and OpenFlow manager. Flow insertion (deletion) consists of
inserting (removing) a flow from Ravel’s rm table. This change in the database invokes the triggers that look
up the corresponding flow’s match fields and action, and pass it to the OpenFlow manager. The triggers
are invoked once for each of the five switches along the path. We installed two flows in each switch, for the
forward and reverse path. For rerouting, we removed a link along the path between a random source and
destination five hops apart. The update triggers Ravel to find a new path (also five hops) then invokes the
network-specific triggers to remove the flow from the switches along the old path and insert the flow into
the switches along the new path. We report the per-switch average in Figure 3.9 across 30 trials.






















Figure 3.9: Sources of delay for route insertion, deletion, and rerouting in the network runtime using message
queues. Reported times are per-switch average along a five-hop path
OpenFlow manager. Thus, the database trigger terminates after the message is queued. In Figure 3.9, on
the bottom, we can these operations take less than 0.5ms. The message queue is read by the OpenFlow
manager, which constructs a flow modification message and sends it to the appropriate switch using Pox.
This operation takes less than 1ms for adding and removing a flow. Rerouting, which requires removing the
old flow and inserts a new flow, takes around 1ms. The top of Figure 3.9 shows the switch programming
delay for a flow entry. Switch delay is measured using a barrier message sent after the flow modification
message. The end-to-end delay for inserting or removing a flow (i.e., the forward and reverse path) on a















































Figure 3.10: Comparison of average per-switch flow install and reroute time for a path length of five, using
different protocols for triggers to communicate with the OpenFlow manager
Next, we examined the performance of the three protocols a trigger can use to communicate with the
OpenFlow manager: RPC, message queues, and ovs-ofctl. We tested two variants of our message queue
protocol. The first is an unoptimized version with only one trigger written in Python. Database queries for
the flow’s match and action rules use psycopg. The optimized version separates the trigger into two parts: a
SQL trigger that queries the database and a Python trigger that adds the result of the query to the message
queue. We measured end-to-end time for flow insertion and rerouting (i.e., starting by adding a new flow
into rm or bringing down a link in tp) for paths of length 3, 5, and 7 over 30 trials and report time as the
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per-switch average in Figure 3.10.
We can see ovs-ofctl takes around 100ms per switch to install a flow. RPC and both variants of
message queues improve flow insertion time by an order of magnitude since these protocols do not block on
the switch programming and instead install the rule asynchronously. Additionally, we see that separating





In Chapters 2 and 3, we propose techniques to provide an operator with techniques to automatically
search for unpredictable behavior of SDN applications at the control and management planes. In this
chapter, we examine the output of applications and the correctness of the data plane updates they produce.
The execution of an application’s event handler, and any subsequent handlers it may trigger, will produce
data plane updates. Even given a set of correct applications and composition plan, bugs in the controller’s
implementation could introduce unexpected behavior through unexpected updates. For example, there are
cases where bugs in the controller can cause flows to be removed at the wrong time [10], failure of flows to be
removed [9, 11], and incorrect logic that could affect the expected output of an application [5]. As a result, an
operator may need to understand the low-level implementation details of the controller to comprehensively
reason about the output of the composed application set. Additionally, unexpected behavior may arise if an
operator’s specification of correctness when exploring application behavior at the management and control
planes is incomplete.
Therefore, in this chapter, we introduce an autocorrection [105] primitive to automatically repair SDN
updates that violate operator-specified policies. Unlike prior work on synthesis for SDN [91, 90, 104], this
project approaches it with a real-time performance constraint. We introduce NEAt, a tool to modify updates
at runtime from unmodified SDN applications to satisfy policies such as reachability and segmentation.
The work in this chapter was co-authored with Wenxuan Zhou, Bingzhe Liu, Matthew Caesar, and P.
Brighten Godfrey. 1 It was published in 2017 ACM Symposium on SDN Research (SOSR) [105].
This main research questions motivating this work are presented below.
• How can we enforce and repair correctness on-the-fly without modifications to control programs?
• How can we constrain divergence between application state and network state in the face of repairs?
1§§ 4.5.1–4.5.2, 4.8.1 were developed by Wenxuan Zhou, and § 4.6.2 by Bingzhe Liu.
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4.1 Introduction
Modern enterprise networks must comply with highly stringent security demands, including regulatory
requirements, or industry standards, such as PCI, HIPAA, and SOX. As a result, network operators must
carefully design and maintain their networks to follow those policies, by mapping out device contexts and
access to sensitive resources, assessing risk, and installing access control policies that effectively mitigate
that risk. However, mistakes and errors in implementing the policies can result in costly data breaches,
segmentation violations, and infiltrations. Through 2020, Gartner predicts 99% of firewall breaches will be
caused by misconfigurations [3, 4].
While discovering and troubleshooting these bugs is essential to maintaining network security, doing so
is notoriously hard. Relying on humans to configure and maintain the network configuration is not only
prone to mistakes, but slow. Given the sophistication and speed at which new attack vectors propagate,
manually updating and testing new configurations leaves the network in a vulnerable state until the attack
vector is fully secured. Furthermore, maintaining a security posture in the presence of SDN is even more
challenging. While SDN enables new functionality, application designers may not be aware of the policy or
security requirements of the networks on which their applications will be deployed. Worse yet, SDN appli-
cations written in general-purpose languages such as Java or Python can be arbitrarily complex. Requiring
applications to implement and modify their behavior to support a broad spectrum of policies needed across
a large range of networks presents an almost insurmountable challenge.
To this end, we present NEAt, a transparent layer to automatically repair policy-violating updates in
real-time. NEAt secures the network with a mechanism similar to a smartphone’s autocorrect feature, which
enables on-the-fly repair to policy-violating updates and ensures the network is always in a state consistent
with policy. Unlike prior work on update synthesis, NEAt maintains backward compatibility and flexibility
to run general SDN application code. To do this, NEAt does not synthesize network state from scratch, but
rather influences updates from an existing SDN application toward a correct specification. In particular,
NEAt enforces a concrete definition of correctness by influencing and constraining dynamically arriving
network instructions. To formulate correctness criteria, we construct a set of policy graphs to represent a
human operator’s correctness intent, which is based on the observation that important error conditions can
be caught by a concise set of boundary conditions. NEAt sits between an SDN controller and the forwarding
devices, and intercepts the updates proposed by the running SDN applications. If the update violates an
operator’s defined policy, such as reachability or segmentation, NEAt transforms the update into one that
complies with the policy.
A key challenge we face in this approach is discovering update repairs in real-time. In NEAt, we build
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on prior work on verification to efficiently model packet forwarding behavior as a set of Equivalence Classes
(ECs) [61, 106]. Upon receiving an update from the controller, NEAt computes the set of affected ECs
and checks for a violation in the same manner as [61]. To repair the violation, we cast the problem as
an optimization problem, to find the minimum number of changes (added or deleted edges) to repair the
violating EC’s forwarding graph. To rapidly compute repairs on arbitrarily large networks, we exploit two
optimization techniques, topology limitation which “slices” away irrelevant part of the network, and graph
compression, to compress both an EC’s forwarding graph and the topology. We then solve the optimization
problem on the sliced and compressed graphs.
Furthermore, as NEAt repairs policy-violating updates, stateful applications — without knowledge of the
violating or repaired updates — will diverge from the underlying network state. To address this problem,
applications can interactively propose updates to NEAt and receive notifications of repairs with minor mod-
ifications to application code. Thus, applications can remain unmodified and leverage NEAt transparently
in a pass-through mode, with a risk of state divergence, or propose updates in an interactive mode.
A preliminary evaluation of our prototype shows promising results. On topologies with up to 125 switches
and 250 hosts, NEAt can discover repairs in under 1 second for applications with non-overlapping rules, and
under 2 seconds for applications with more complex dependencies. Furthermore, we find NEAt can verify
and repair updates on realistic data planes. On a large enterprise network with one million forwarding rules,
NEAt discovers and repairs 28 loop violations. Simulations on this dataset show NEAt can verify and repair
reachability and loop freedom policies in under a second.
4.2 Background and Motivation
Enterprise network policies must compose together requirements from a variety of demands, such as
government or industry regulations, to mitigate risk for attack vectors, and limit access to sensitive resources.
As a result, network operators must take into account complex, composed policies when configuring or
updating a network.
Composing together such policies is a slow and often error-prone process for a human operator. The
operator may introduce errors translating the demands into high-level policies, or translating the policies into
low-level routing configurations. A recent study [63] found that operators make changes to their networks at
least once per day, while more than 80% were concerned updates would break existing functionality unrelated
to a given change. While tools [61, 58] exist to automatically discover misconfigurations in real-time, they
offer the operator no guidance on how to repair the misconfiguration beyond the type of correctness property
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that is violated.
Instead, a system to automatically repair updates, ensuring the network always remains consistent with
the operator’s policy, can relieve a slow and error-prone task from the configuration process. If an update
violates a given property in the network, a repair should fix the cause of the violation while maintaining
the original purpose of the update. We argue a minimal change is best, to repair the update with the least
number of added or removed edges. Furthermore, such a system should improve upon a manual effort with
transparency in both architecture and performance. A system that requires hours or days to verify and
repair a network is not useful if the process can be completed manually in just a few minutes. It should also
not require modifying or redesigning existing infrastructure.
However, accomplishing this task in real-time is challenging due to the size of the network and the data
plane state. To efficiently reason about the data plane, we build on previous work in data plane verifica-
tion [61, 106] that separates forwarding behavior into Equivalence Classes (ECs) of packets. All packets
within an EC are forwarded in precisely the same manner. From each EC, we can extract a configuration
graph that defines the forwarding behavior for packets within the EC. A repair for a given EC must then
explore additions or deletions of links in the configuration graph. Finding a link addition requires examining
the topology graph defined by the edges in the physical topology. To efficiently discover repairs, we propose
two optimization techniques to compress the configuration and topology graphs, described in § 4.6. We refer
to the outcome of these techniques as the compressed configuration graph and compressed topology graph.
Finally, a repair system should ideally support both unmodified and modified applications. Burdening
developers or operators with the task of modifying their applications to support the latest extension is
unreasonable, but those that want more specific control over the repair process should have the option to
do so. A pass-through mode could allow an operator to transparently leverage automated repairs, without
the need to modify existing applications, while an interactive mode could provide the application with finer-
grained control over the choice of repairs. Furthermore, an interactive mode would allow the application to
ensure its state is consistent with that of the network, as it can update its own state after choosing one of
several potential repairs for the policy-violating update.
4.3 Design
At the core of NEAt is a verification and correction layer, which ensures only updates conforming to the
network policies are sent onto the network. This layer receives updates from one of two integration modes






















Figure 4.1: System architecture of NEAt
4.3.1 Verification and Repair
NEAt’s verification and correction engines ensure the network is always consistent with the defined pol-
icy. To start, NEAt takes as input a policy graph ( 1 ), which defines the network policies (e.g., reachability,
segmentation, waypointing) in the form of a directed graph. Next, NEAt receives updates (e.g., flow modifi-
cation messages) from the SDN control infrastructure. For each update (i.e., each flow modification message)
( 2 ), NEAt applies the change to a network model, from which the ECs affected by the update are com-
puted. Using the policy graph, NEAt checks each affected EC in the network model for policy violations
using the verification engine ( 3 ). If the update does not introduce any violations, it is sent onto the net-
work. However, if it does introduce a violation, the configuration graph and topology graph are compressed
and passed to the correction engine ( 4 ). The optimizer returns a set of edges to be added or removed to
the EC’s configuration graph, which are then applied to the network model, converted to OpenFlow rules,
and sent to the forwarding devices ( 5 ).
NEAt’s correction engine models the process of discovering repairs as an optimization problem. Our
exploration of alternative approaches guided us toward this optimization problem-based solution for perfor-
mance considerations. For example, consider a brute force approach that discovers repairs for a given EC by
testing all possible permutations of edge additions and removals to the EC’s configuration graph. A repair
that requires only adding edges, from 10 possible unused topology edges, would need to explore 10! (˜3.6M)
permutations. If the violating property can be checked in just 1ms, each EC could take up to 10 minutes to














Figure 4.2: Integration modes of NEAt
4.3.2 Integration Modes
With each repair, inconsistencies between application state and network state will arise. To prevent
applications from diverging from the underlying network state, NEAt exposes two integration modes: pass-
through and interactive.
In pass-through mode, NEAt acts as a transparent layer that sits between the controller and forwarding
devices. This mode enforces network policies without modifications to the controller applications. Both the
controller and applications are unaware of NEAt in this mode. NEAt intercepts updates from the controller,
as well as updates from the network about link and switch state, and passes it to the verification and repair
engines.
Interactive mode enables applications to leverage NEAt’s verification and repair process by checking
proposed updates. An application passes to NEAt a set of updates, which are checked against the current
network model. If the updates introduce a violation, NEAt returns a set of repaired updates, which the
application can accept or reject. If the application accepts the changes, it can send them onto the network
and update its state, ensuring the application and network state are consistent. If the application rejects
the changes, it can propose another set of updates to NEAt. Interactive mode requires modifications to
applications to update its state with the accepted change.
NEAt maintains consistency between the integration modes, allowing applications and the controller to
both simultaneously benefit from NEAt’s automated repair. For example, one application can use NEAt’s
API while another remains unmodified, allowing its updates to be checked by NEAt in pass-through mode.
4.4 Policies as Graphs
Many existing tools reason about individual network paths [61, 59]. While this approach has proven
effective for network data plane verification, synthesizing network state changes requires viewing the entire
network as a whole (i.e., a graph), as changes that repair one path may influence the correctness of other
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A B(m,n)
Figure 4.3: Policy edge
paths. In addition, expressing network correctness conditions as a graph instead of a collection of paths
enables dealing with a richer set of policies, for instance, path consistency and load balancing. Based on this
intuition, NEAt takes as input a set of intended policies, and formulates these policies as directed graphs
called policy graphs.
Edges on a policy graph are marked with notations denoting different types of reachability constraints.
For example, the graph in Figure 4.3 specifies a requirement that at least m paths exist from node A to B,







Figure 4.4: Policy graph
A basic reachability requirement can be expressed with m = 1 and n unspecified, as shown in edges
A → B and B → C in Figure 4.4. When n is specified, we get a bounded path length reachability policy
(e.g., D → C in Figure 4.4). Shortest path policies can be viewed as a special case of a bounded path policy,
and can be encoded in a similar way. When m > 1, the edge expresses a multipath invariant (e.g., D → C
in Figure 4.4), whereas m = 0 specifies that two ends of the edge are required to be isolated from each
other (e.g., E → C in Figure 4.4). Furthermore, concatenating edges together can denote service chaining
policies. As shown in Figure 4.4, traffic from node A should traverse a waypoint B before reaching C.
One special case is expressing a load balancing policy, as this typically requires distributing traffic in a
certain way among a pool of servers. In our policy model, this can be expressed by assigning m a fractional
value, in contrast to the integer values it takes in the previous examples. Figure 4.5 denotes a policy that













Figure 4.5: Load balancing policy
graphs to express both qualitative and quantitative reachability constraints on the network.
4.5 Repair Algorithm
In this section, we present NEAt’s core algorithm for repairing violations in real-time constrained by a
given policy graph. First, we introduce the network model and give an overview of the algorithm. Next, we
describe our formulation of the repair problem for basic reachability policies as an integer linear programming
(ILP) problem. We then generalize this approach to repair the wider range of policies discussed in § 4.4.
Network Model
As described in § 4.3, upon intercepting an update, NEAt constructs a network graph model for each
affected EC that captures the forwarding behavior for all packets within the EC. This directed configuration
graph `c, along with a topology graph T and policy graph ℘ serve as inputs to the repair algorithm.
Each node in these graphs represents a host or a networking device, and each edge between a pair of
nodes defines reachability between them. The policy graph ℘ is a directed graph constructed from a set of
conflict-free policies that represents the expected behavior of the whole network and hence should not be
violated at runtime. Each node in the policy graph represents a device or a group of equivalent devices, and




The configuration graph for equivalence
class c.
℘ The policy graph.
T The topology graph.
(i, j) The edge from node i to node j.
ρij The paths between node i and node j.
Cci The cluster of node i for equivalence class c.
ci The compressed node i for C
c
i .
E(a) The set of all edges in graph a.
N(E(a)) Number of all edges in graph a.
NBa(i)
The set of all neighbors of node i in
graph a.
Table 4.1: Key notations in problem formulation
tools like PGA [87], which is out of the scope of this work. A topology graph T is an undirected graph that
represents the physical topology of the network.
Algorithm Overview
When the verification engine discovers a violated EC, the repair algorithm is executed. Its goal is to repair
the detected violations optimally, i.e., with the minimum number of changes to the original configuration.
Upon receiving the violated EC c together with its configuration graph `c, NEAt formulates the problem as
an optimization problem: we aim to add or delete the minimum number of edges on `c so that the modified
`c complies with ℘c. ℘c is a subgraph of ℘ that is relevant to EC c. Note that the added or deleted edges
are constrained within the topology graph T . We solve the optimization problem using ILP.
In § 4.5.1, we describe the repair algorithm for basic reachability policies, and § 4.5.2 enhances the basic
algorithm to cope with the entire set of policies in § 4.4. We complete the section with our repair algorithm
for forwarding loops (§ 4.5.3). Table 4.1 summarizes the key notations used in this section and § 4.6.
4.5.1 Repair Basic Reachability
After receiving a configuration graph `c that violates the desired policies from the verification engine,
the optimizer determines the minimum number of edges that needs to be added or deleted to ensure `c is
consistent with the policy graph ℘c using Integer Linear Programming (ILP). We start with the basic case
where ℘c contains only reachability constraints.
Our integer program has a set of binary decision variables xi,j,p,q and xi,j where
xi,j,p,q, (i, j) ∈ ET , (p, q) ∈ E℘c (4.1)
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xi,j , (i, j) ∈ ET (4.2)
ET and E℘c denote the set of all edges in T and ℘c respectively. Variable xi,j,p,q defines the mapping between
a physical edge and a policy graph edge. It is 1 if a directed edge (i, j) is mapped to policy edge (p, q) for
the current EC c, i.e., the flow from p to q will be forwarded through edge (i, j) from i to j. Variable xi,j
defines whether or not edge (i, j) is used for forwarding this EC’s traffic regardless of which flow uses it.
Edge (i, j) in T is selected if any flow (p, q) is forwarded through (i, j) (Equation 4.3). Similarly, for the
other direction (j, i), we have Equation 4.4. No physical link can be selected to forward traffic for the same
EC on both directions (Equation 4.5) to avoid tight loops.












∀(j, i) xi,j + xj,i ≤ 1 (4.5)
Equations 4.6-4.8 are the flow conservation equations for policy-level reachability (p, q).
∀(p, q),∀i ∈ T : 
∑
j∈NBT (i) xi,j,p,q = 1∑
j∈NBT (i) xj,i,p,q = 0
if i = p (4.6)

∑
j∈NBT (i) xi,j,p,q = 0∑
j∈NBT (i) xj,i,p,q = 1
if i = q (4.7)
{∑
j∈NBT (i)(xi,j,p,q − xj,i,p,q) = 0 otherwise (4.8)










4.5.2 Generalizing the Algorithm
To support the general reachability policies as discussed in § 4.4, we encode several additional constraints
into the ILP.
Isolation
We introduce a special DROP node. If two nodes are required to be isolated, i.e., the nodes are connected
with a (0, ) edge in the policy graph, we change the way the flow conservation equations are defined. More




j∈NBT (i) xi,j,p,q = 0∑
j∈NBT (i) xj,i,p,q = 1
if i = DROP (4.10)
Service Chaining
With service chaining, or waypointing, we enhance our flow conservation equations with Equation 4.11.
This extends it beyond the individual reachability requirements in the policy, and takes into account de-
pendencies between policy edges. The resulting mapping is guaranteed to satisfy chaining of reachability
requirements. For instance, if a policy node i is required to reach q through p, because of this equation, i
cannot be mapped to the path segment (p, q). Otherwise, p might be skipped on the path from i to q.

∑
j∈NBT (i) xi,j,p,q = 0∑
j∈NBT (i) xj,i,p,q = 0
if i ∈ ℘c and (∃ρi,por ∃ρq,i) (4.11)
Bounded or Equal Path Length
A special case is a shortest path policy, where the bounded length is the length of the shortest physical




(xi,j,p,q + xj,i,p,q) ≤ n (4.12)
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Multipath
If at least m link-disjoint paths are required for flow (p, q), the flow conservation equations (Equations
4.6 and 4.7) are updated with Equations 4.13 and 4.14, respectively.

∑
j∈NBT (i) xi,j,p,q ≥ m∑
j∈NBT (i) xj,i,p,q = 0
if i = p (4.13)

∑
j∈NBT (i) xi,j,p,q ≥ m∑
j∈NBT (i) xj,i,p,q = 1
if i = q (4.14)
Load Balancing
As discussed in § 4.4, policy edges within a load balancing policy are denoted with a decimal path count.
Correspondingly, in our optimization problem, variables that map physical edges to policy edges are also
decimal values between zero and one, instead of binary values. In addition to this change, we introduce a
new equation (Equation 4.15) to capture how flow distribution propagates.
∏
xi,j,p,q 6=0
xi,j,p,q = m (4.15)
For example, consider a physical topology shown in Figure 4.6, with two layers of load balancing between
client C and servers S1 − S5. If the policy in Figure 4.5 is required, the solutions for variables (xi,j) are
shown in Figure 4.6.
4.5.3 Repairing Loops
The preceding repair algorithm operates on a loop-free configuration graph. As such, we first check for
and remove loops from each configuration graph before compressing and repairing violations of any other
property type. Our objective for repairing loops is to minimize change to the network, with a preference
to affect as few equivalence classes as possible, as well as remove the minimal number of rules. Thus, our
algorithm will remove a forwarding rule matching packets destined to 10.0.0.1/32 over one for 10.0.0.0/8.
Since loops are repaired first, and NEAt will later check reachability properties on each equivalence class, our
loop repair algorithm does not need to consider introducing permanent reachability violations by removing
rules.

















Figure 4.6: Load balancing configuration
configuration graph `c and N(Θ(c)) the number of loops in `c. θi is a subgraph of `c, and N(θi) = 0 when
the subgraph contains no loops. The algorithm begins by finding and removing all intersecting edges across
`c’s loops. For each loop in `c that is not repaired by removing these edges, next remove an edge (i, j) where
i’s IP address is the destination, if such an edge exists. While θi still has loops, remove an edge in the loop
that has the most specific match rule (e.g., longest prefix). Each edge is mapped to a specific forwarding
rule at a particular switch when we compute the equivalence classes.
Removal of a forwarding rule is accomplished by replacing it with a drop rule, to prevent a coarser match
in a separate equivalence class from introducing another loop. For example, if a rule matching destination
IP 10.0.0.1/32 is simply deleted from a switch’s forwarding table, another rule matching 10.0.0.1/31 on the
same switch and forwarding to the same next hop could prevent the loop from being repaired. To conserve
switch memory during repairs, NEAt checks all coarser drop rules to determine if multiple rules can be
aggregated together.
4.6 Optimizations
While conceptually straightforward, the mapping algorithm in § 4.5 does not scale to a large network. In
the optimization problem formulation, the number of variables for one EC is approximately the product of
the number of edges in the physical topology and the number of edges of the policy graph, which can easily
exceed 100k. In this section, we present two techniques that dramatically optimize the repair speed.
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Algorithm 4.1 Loop repair
procedure RemoveLoop(`c, Θ(c))
# remove edges appearing in multiple loops
remove {(i, j) | (i, j) ∈ θk ∧ (i, j) ∈ θm∀k,m ∈ Θ(c)}
if N(Θ(c)) = 0 then
return `c
end if
for all θi ∈ Θ(c) do
while N(θi) > 0 do
# remove edges forwarded out the destination
remove (i, j) if i is destination
end while
while N(θi) > 0 do
# remove most specific forwarding rule





This technique aims to “slice” away irrelevant or redundant part of the network, and thus shrink the
size of the optimization problem. After detecting a policy violation on a forward graph, before running our
optimization mapping problem, we first remove disconnected components in the physical topology. Next, we
localize the potential affected area in the topology. Fortunately, most modern networks are designed with a
hierarchical structure. Examples include data centers arranged in a fat-tree topology, and enterprise networks
divided into multiple sites joined by a backbone network. Such a structure implies certain communication
patterns: communication within a subtree should stay local, for example, and communication between
subtrees normally doesn’t traverse other subtrees, i.e., traversing through a valley. Based on this, in our
linear programming problem, typically only a subset of the topology is considered mappable to a policy
edge. Results in § 4.8 shows the effectiveness of this technique.
4.6.2 Graph Compression
Other than hierarchical structures, most large networks are designed using patterns that enforce sym-
metry to some extent [85] for load balancing or resilience. For example, in a data center fat-tree topology,
devices in the same layer (access, aggregate, core) are symmetrically connected to multiple devices on the
neighboring layers. We exploit such regularities to compress the graphs that the repair algorithm operates
on. The key to this idea is that the compressed graphs must be equivalent to the original graphs with
respect to the policies of interest. To this end, we leverage a graph pattern preserving algorithm [41] as the
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(a) Before compression (b) After compression
Figure 4.7: Example of compression
major building block of NEAt’s compressor (Figure 4.1). The algorithm compresses a labeled directed graph
according to a bisimulation relation.
Bisimulation Relation [36]
We denote G = (V,E, L) as a labeled directed graph. V represents a set of nodes and (u, v) ∈ E
represents a directed edge from node u to node v. L(u) ∈ Γ represents the label of node u, where Γ is the
set of labels applied to V . In the context of a networked system, the labels may represent a set of similarly
functional nodes, e.g., hosts, firewalls, load balancers. For example, in Figure 4.7a, we label the network
nodes as Firewall, Edge Router and Core Router, and we label the two hosts as HostA and HostB.
A bisimulation relation on a graph G = (V,E,L) is a binary relation BR ⊆ V × V such that for each
(u, v) ∈ BR, i) L(u) = L(v); ii) for each (u, u′) ∈ E, there exists an edge (v, v′) ∈ E such that (u′, v′) ∈ BR;
and iii) for each (v, v′) ∈ E, there exists an edge (u, u′) ∈ E such that (u′, v′) ∈ BR. One can verify that in
Figure 4.7a Firewall2 and Firewall3 are bisimular to each other, while Firewall1 is not bisimular to any
other firewall. Because HostB is solely in a bisimular cluster, EdgeRouter1 and EdgeRouter2 are bisimular
as they only have one child HostB. As Firewall2 and Firewall3 have children that are bisimular, they
are bisimular to each other. While Firewall1’s child is Core Router, which has a different label than Edge
Router, Firewall1 is not bisimular to anyone.
Bisimulation Based Compression
Algorithm 4.2 presents the compression algorithm on the given graphs `c, ℘c and T . We compute the
bisimulation relation on `c using the algorithms presented in [36] and then compress the graphs based on
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their bisimularity. However, unlike `c and ℘c, T is not a directed graph, and thus the original algorithm is not
applicable. To compute T cp, we first compress the parts in T that overlap with `c according to the undirected
version of `cpc . We then add edges between the non-overlapping parts and the compressed parts with their
original edges in T . The time complexity of the compression algorithm is O(|E|log|V |). Figure 4.7b shows
the compression result on graph `c. Firewall2 and Firewall3 are bisimular and are compressed to a new
cluster named FW2. Firewall1 remains by itself as FW1. ℘c is compressed in a similar way.
Algorithm 4.2 Graph pattern preserving compression
procedure Clustering(`c, ℘c, T )
compute the maximum bisimulation relation BR of `c
compute the clusters clusters = V/BR
collapse the nodes in each cluster ∈ clusters









We evaluate the compression algorithm on a simulated fat-tree topology and a large enterprise network.
We denote the compression rate rc as the ratio of the number of remaining nodes in `
cp
c to the number of
nodes in the original graph `c. Table 4.2 shows the compression results. From the results we can conclude
that the compression algorithm could result in a much smaller amount of nodes for large-scale networks.
Topology 1− rc
Fat-tree (6750 hosts, 1125 switches) 99.38%
Enterprise (236 routers) 88.98%
Table 4.2: Compression results
Incremental Compression
Further leveraging the incremental compression algorithm from [41], we incrementally maintain the com-
pressed configuration graphs. In response to changes on the original graphs, the incremental algorithm
computes the new compressed graph using the changes and the compressed graph as input, independent of
the original graph. That is, there is no need to decompress the graph to propagate the changes.
Repairing Compressed Graphs
With the compression module in place, when a violation is detected, the graphs are compressed and
then passed to the optimizer. Note that one compressed topology graph edge may represent a collection of
original topology graph edges. This works with single-path reachability types of policies, such as reachability,
isolation, or service chaining. However, it will break Equations 4.13 and 4.14 for link-disjoint multipath
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policies. Our solution is to label predecessors of a multipath policy destination (e.g., q for policy edge
(p, q)) node differently, such that they are not compressed into a single cluster. In addition, the compressed
topology graph is modeled as a weighted graph, where the weight on each edge is the number of original
edges the compressed edge represents. Multipath policy constraint Equation 4.13 is modified accordingly as
Equation 4.16, whereas Equation 4.14 remains the same because there are never multiple edges pointing to
the destination node q.

∑
j∈NBTcp (i)(xi,j,p,q ∗ weighti,j) >= m∑
j∈NBTcp (i) xj,i,p,q = 0
if i = p (4.16)
Map Back
The last step is to map the results back to the original graphs. The optimization result is a set of
changes (added or deleted edges) on the compressed graphs. To map back to the original configuration
graph, a changed edge (ci, cj) could become a set of changed edges between the cluster C
c
i and cluster
Ccj . If an edge (ci, cj) is supposed to be added to the compressed configuration graph, then on the original
configuration graph, for every node i in the source cluster Cci , there should be an edge added from i to one
of its neighbor node j that is in the target cluster Ccj . By the definition of bisimulation, such a node j always
exists. On the other hand, if an edge (ci, cj) should be removed from the compressed configuration graph, all
edges between the two clusters should be removed on the original graph. Afterward, the computed changes
are translated into forwarding instructions and sent to the network devices.
Policy Preservation
We prove the compression algorithm preserves equivalence between the compressed graph Gc and the
original graph G with respect to the scope of policies in § 4.4. Equivalence is proved in [41] for graph
pattern queries. A graph pattern query is effectively asserting single-path type reachability and bounded
path length. Therefore, we only need to prove the conclusion also holds for multipath policies.
Theorem 4.1 (Multipath Equivalence). A multipath policy for a flow (p, q) holds on G iff the policy also
holds for (p, q) on Gc.
Proof. Consider a multipath policy that requires at least m paths for flow (p, q). Trivially, if a flow (p, q)
satisfies the policy on G, the policy also holds for (p, q) on Gc, and the flow conservation equations (Equa-
tions 4.16, 4.14 and 4.7) are satisfied. Therefore, we must prove the policy holds when Equation 4.16, 4.14,




2, . . . , path
c
n (n ≤ m) be the set of paths from p to q on Gc that collectively satisfy
Equations 4.16, 4.14, and 4.7. If n equals m, then there are m link-disjoint paths on Gc between p and q,
and thus there are m link-disjoint paths on G, i.e., the policy is satisfied.
If n < m, there must be at least a path on Gc, whose starting edge’s weight is greater than one. Let
those paths be pathcm0, . . . , path
c
mj , whose starting weights are k0, . . . , kj respectively. Consider path path
c
m0
first. This means its starting edge is pointing from p to a cluster Cnext which contains at least k0 nodes that
are also p’s successors. Because the predecessors of q are labeled differently, each is a separate cluster. By
definition of the bisimulation relation, two nodes are bisimular (and thus can be clustered together) only if
their children’s label set is the same. Via back propagation, and constrained by Equation 4.7, there must be
at least k0 disjoint paths on G from p’s successors in Cnext to q’s predecessors. Similarly, iterating through
all paths from p to q on Gc, there are at least m paths from p to q on G.
4.7 Implementation
We implemented a prototype of NEAt in Python. NEAt requires no modifications to the controller or
switches. The verification engine is based on [61] and we use the Gurobi Optimizer [6] within our optimization
engine to solve the ILP.
NEAt’s pass-through mode is implemented as a proxy between the controller and switches, listening for
flow modification messages. The interactive mode is implemented as an XML-RPC API, allowing it to be
compatible with applications written in any language or for any controller. More specifically, NEAt exposes
a check() function that accepts an OpenFlow flow modification message to check against the network policy.
NEAt updates the network model with the proposed change, verifies the model, and searches for a set of
repairs if any violations are found. The application can choose to receive the repairs as a set of OpenFlow
flow modification messages or as a set of edge tuples. For example, a load balancer application may wish to
receive the repairs as a set of tuples (e.g., [(s2, h1)]) to easily re-assign a client to a particular server replica,
rather than parsing OpenFlow messages from NEAt.
4.8 Evaluation
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Figure 4.10: Repair time for different policies
4.8.1 Repair Performance
To evaluate the feasibility and scalability of NEAt’s repair process, we synthesized a set of fat-tree
topologies with various sizes, and used NEAt to maintain a variety of network-wide policies, including
reachability, segmentation, bounded path length and multipath policies. More specifically, on each topology,
under random removals of rules, we measured the repair time for each removal that caused a violation.
Exact Matching Rules
We first focus on flow-based traffic management applications, which are widely used in SDN [57, 49, 20,
55, 53]. Any forwarding rule produced by such applications at a switch matches at most one flow. In our
terms, each rule only affects at most one EC.
For each fat-tree topology, we randomly selected a pair of pods. We used a pod-pair reachability policy,
which specifies that any host in one of the pods should be able to reach every other host in both selected
pods. We randomly removed a rule and triggered the optimizer to perform a repair on each EC violating
this policy. We verified the resulting configuration graph after each repair and found that it satisfied the
policy in every case.
On a fat-tree topology with 250 hosts and 125 switches, we measured the time taken to repair pod-pair
reachability policy using four mechanisms: i) plain mapping, ii) mapping with topology limitation, iii) map-
ping with graph compression, and iv) mapping with both compression and topology limitation. Figure 4.8
compares the CDFs of the repair time for these four repair mechanisms. We can see the combination of
graph compression and topology limitation (leftmost curve) brings approximately one order of magnitude
speed-up over plain mapping (rightmost curve). Figure 4.9 (a-e) shows the speed-up increases as the network
size scales. Even on a network with 686 hosts and 245 switches, the repair time is bounded under 0.1 second












Figure 4.11: Exact matching rules vs. overlapping rules
We next explored how NEAt handles a larger set of policies and a combination of different types of
policies. We use a policy specifies that every pair of hosts should be able to reach each other, which we
will refer to as an all-pair reachability policy. On a fat-tree topology with 250 hosts and 125 switches, we
measured the repair time under random rule removals against this all-pair reachability policy and report
the results in Figure 4.10. The policy size is increased by approximately 10 times compared with pod-pair
reachability policy, but the repair time only increases slightly.
To test a more complex setting, we randomly selected three pods in a fat-tree topology. Between the first
two pods, we specify that hosts should be isolated from each other (segmentation), and between the first and
third selected pods, hosts should be connected by at least two paths (multipath). For host pairs that do not
fall into the previous two conditions, they should be able to reach each other (all-pair reachability). Both
multipath and all-pair reachability are combined with a bounded path length policy, to avoid flows between
pods traversing a valley. Note that unlike the previous pure single-path reachability policy, where repairs are
all edge additions, in this case a repair can be a combination of edge additions and deletions. Furthermore,
to satisfy the multipath requirement, more additions are necessary. Due to this complexity, the repair time
increases, but is still on the same order of magnitude as the previous reachability policy cases, as shown in
Figure 4.10. We verified each repair and found that the violation was repaired without affecting any of the
other policies in every case.
Overlapping Rules
For networks that use wild-carded rules or longest prefix matching, the assumption in the previous
subsection does not hold. One rule may affect multiple ECs, and thus potentially trigger repairs on multiple
graphs. Fortunately, there is a trend to move such overlapping rules to network edge or even hosts [75, 8, 25],
leaving the core with exact matching rules. In order to study how NEAt performs under this less preferable
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but less common scenario, we assign IP addresses within the same prefix subnet to hosts within the same
pod on the fat-tree topologies. We then aggregated rules on the switches as much as possible. For example,
each core switch has only k forwarding rules, where k is the number of pods, and each rule matches on one
pod’s prefix. Similar to the previous experiment, we used NEAt to guarantee an all-pair reachability policy,
and our engine discovered repairs for all violations. Figure 4.11 compares the CDFs of the repair time for
overlapping and exact matching rules on a 250-host-125-switch fat-tree topology. The repair took longer
compared to applications with exact match rules due to the increased number of affected ECs. With our
graph compression and topology limitation techniques, the repair finishes within 0.4 seconds in the worst
case.
4.8.2 Repair Correctness
NEAt verifies and, if necessary, repairs each update from the controller separately (i.e., one flow modi-
fication message at a time). We ran the algorithm over a wide variety of real and synthetic networks and
did not encounter a single case where the repair failed on the compressed configuration graph when run in
this manner. Furthermore, we compared repairs computed on the compressed and uncompressed graphs,
and the resulting changes were equivalent in all cases. However, as additional assurance, NEAt verifies the
repair on the uncompressed graph and falls back to computing repairs on the uncompressed graph if the
post-repair verification fails. To further reduce repair latency, we compute repairs on both the compressed
and uncompressed graph in parallel, and terminate the latter process once the repair on the compressed
graph is verified.
Nevertheless, we microbenchmarked this scenario by modifying our implementation to produce an incor-
rect repair on the compressed configuration graph. We evaluated the time for the entire process of computing
repairs on both graphs in parallel and falling back to the uncompressed graph repair. We found that the
resulting latency was still under 0.5 seconds on a 10-pod fat-tree network (i.e., 250 hosts, 125 switches) with
a pod-pair reachability policy.
4.8.3 End-to-End Delay
Next, we examined the application-level delay introduced by NEAt when using its interactive mode. We
tested NEAt on various-sized fat-tree topologies using Mininet [7] and the Pox controller [14]. A learning
switch application and load balancer application run on top of Pox. The load balancer balances flows
between the two replicas in a round-robin fashion, and we modified it to leverage NEAt’s API to check

























Figure 4.12: Application-perceived latency of NEAt, on various fat-tree topologies, showing performance for
a reachability policy with/without graph compression and topology limitation
mapping with one suggested by NEAt. While the learning switch remains unmodified and unaware of NEAt,
its updates are transparently checked by NEAt. This setup demonstrates the ability of NEAt to interact
with the controller and applications simultaneously through its two integration modes.
The load balancer application runs on an edge switch in the fat-tree topology, with clients and server
replicas placed in different pods. To trigger an update, a client pings the virtual IP of the load balancer.
When the appropriate event handler in the load balancer is executed, it invokes NEAt’s check() function.
We measured the total latency introduced by NEAt as the time to invoke the check() function and apply
any repairs to the application’s state. This includes the time to verify an update (i.e, calculate equivalence
classes affected by the update, compute their configuration graphs, and verify them) and repair violations
in any of the affected equivalence classes.
For each topology size, we examined the total latency for a reachability policy, with and without our
compression and topology limitation optimizations. Figure 4.12 shows the total delay experienced by the load
balancer. Topology limitation has the largest speed-up of our optimizations, but when used in combination
with compression of the topology and configuration graphs, NEAt can verify and repair an update in under
120ms.
4.8.4 Enterprise Network Trace Study
Finally, we examined traces from a large enterprise network, to evaluate NEAt’s performance on real
forwarding graphs. We examined two dumps of the data plane from 2014 and 2017. These datasets contained
more than one million forwarding rules across more than 200 forwarding devices. The 2014 dataset contains
27k equivalence classes, while the 2017 trace contains 285k.
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Bugs
For each dataset, we constructed loop and reachability policies and check for violations. In the 2014
dataset, NEAt found nine different loops. In the 2017 dataset, NEAt found 19. We examined the forwarding
table and found several of these were caused by default routes with prefix 0.0.0.0/0. Only equivalence classes
with more specific rules on the device were free of loops in these cases. Another cause we discovered is load
balancing – a device can forward packets out one of two ports, one of which will result in a path containing
a loop.
Simulation
We next used the 2017 dataset to evaluate NEAt’s scale and performance on a data plane with a realistic
number of equivalence classes. First, we verified and repaired any loops in the 285k equivalence classes
contained in the dataset. We then constructed artificial updates, choosing a destination IP address and
prefix length with the same probability as they appear in the dataset’s forwarding rules. An update can
either add a rule, delete a rule, or introduce a loop. Loops are chosen from the list of those that were
discovered and repaired at the start of the simulation. An update has a 10% chance of introducing one of
these loops, which may affect multiple ECs. We simulated 100 updates, affecting an average of eight ECs
per update.
We applied the set of random updates to different combinations of policies, including loop freedom,
reachability, and our compression and topology limitation optimizations. Since the compression and topology
limitation optimizations only apply to reachability-type policies, we do not test loop freedom in combination
with compression or topology limitation. Figure 4.13 shows a CDF of the total update time, including
verification and repairs (when repairs are necessary). Of the 100 updates, 20 loops violations needed repair,
as well as 24 reachability violations. Median and 98th percentile update times were 10ms and 1300ms,
respectively, for a reachability policy with compression and topology limitation enabled. For a loop freedom
property, median and 98th percentile update times were 35ms and 730ms, respectively. Combining these two
policies, without compression or topology limitation optimizations, resulted in median and 98th percentile
times of 36ms and 193 seconds. Adding our two optimizations reduced these times to 36ms and 6 seconds.
4.8.5 Repair as Configuration Synthesis
In this section, we explore the application of NEAt to synthesis — that is, generating an entire data plane
state from scratch. Specifically, we examined the performance of NEAt on fat-tree topologies to “repair”
an empty configuration graph. In Figure 4.14, we show the total time to repair and verify an all-pair
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Figure 4.13: Total update time for different combinations of policies and optimizations, on a model of a


























Topology Size (#hosts, #switches, #links)
limit nolimit
Figure 4.14: Repair time of an all-pair reachability property on an empty configuration graph
reachability policy. We report the repair time with and without our topology limitation optimization. For
a 10-pod fat-tree topology, the median synthesis time was 6.8 seconds.
4.9 Synthesis and Repair
In the context of this work, we distinguish between synthesis and repair based on the scope and urgency of
the change. We envision repair as a tool for temporary and immediate application, e.g., preventing security
violations or downtime, given a partially correct implementation and a set of correctness policies to guide the
repair. Afterward, the original cause of the policy violation might still need to be addressed, such as updating
the configuration to reflect the new security policy or fixing the bug in the control program’s implementation.
A repair in NEAt, for example, is a change to a network after a single update. It expects the network to
be in a “mostly correct” state – that is, prior to the policy-violating update, all correctness properties in
the network were satisfied. Furthermore, except for aggregating drop rules to repair loops, NEAt does not
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modify prefixes or match fields, for example, to reduce the number of flow table rules. We consider synthesis,
on the other hand, to be useful for construction of longer-lived configurations and programs, without the
need for a partial implementation. In keeping with our smartphone autocorrect analogy, a repair could





Model Checking Programs One class of techniques is model checking, where programs are modeled as
FSAs and their behavior is comprehensively explored [46, 62, 79]. Recent work, like DeLorean, also combines
model checking with symbolic execution [26, 34, 102]. However, most model checking work ignores time.
This approach works well for programs that have a weak dependence on time, but the behavior of control
programs that we study is intricately linked with time. Ignoring time in such programs can lead to exploring
infeasible executions, and it cannot discover unexpected behaviors in which the mismatch is the time gap
between events. One exception is NICE, which studies OpenFlow applications whose behavior can vary
considerably based on packet timings [27]. However, its treatment of time is not systematic and instead
relies on heuristics to explore timer behavior.
Model Checking using TA There has been much work on TA-based model checking in the real-time
systems community. It includes developing efficient tools to explore the TA [19, 24] as well as transformations
that speed up explorations [31, 50]. This body of work assumes that the entire TA is known in advance,
and it does not target program analysis. While we draw heavily on the insights from it, to our knowledge,
our work on DeLorean is the first to use TA to model check programs. We describe general methods to
dynamically and comprehensively explore program executions and techniques to optimize exploration.
Other Debugging Techniques Explicit state model checking, which we use in DeLorean, is complemen-
tary to other program debugging approaches. Record and replay [67] can help diagnose faults after-the-fact
and is especially useful for non-deterministic systems; in contrast, we want to determine if faults can arise in
the future. There has also been work on “what-if” analysis in IP networks, e.g., with the use of shadow con-
figurations [15] and route prediction [43]. These focus on computing the outcomes of configuration changes;
in contract, we study the dynamic behavior of more general programs.
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5.2 Orchestration
Declarative Networking In the pre-SDN era, declarative networking [72, 71, 74] — a combined effort
of deductive database (recursive datalog) and distributed system (distributed query optimization) research
— uses a distributed recursive query engine as an extensible and efficient routing infrastructure. This
allows rapid implementation and deployment of new distributed protocols, making it an alternative design
point that strikes a balance among its peers like overlay [73] and active networks [51]. In Ravel, we build on
relational database research, making novel use of SQL views and contributing new data mediation techniques,
with target usage — mediating applications with higher-level user support in a centralized setting — better
described in network OS and SDN programming APIs.
Database Usage in Network Controllers The use of databases and the notion of network-wide views
are not unfamiliar. Distributed controllers such as Onix [66] and ONOS [21] provide consistent network-wide
views over distributed network elements and multiple controller instances. Unlike Ravel, these systems use
the database as a transactional repository to “outsource” state management for distributed and replicated
network states, and treat the database as a passive recipient that only executes queries and transactions.
Furthermore, the network-wide views are often pre-defined by the system (e.g., Onix’s NIB APIs with
fixed schemas for all control applications), making little use of user-centered database views. In Ravel, the
database is the reactive controller with user-centered database views. Control applications and the dynamic
orchestrations are moved into the database itself, while SQL offers a native means to create and adjust
application-specific ad-hoc views.
5.3 Autocorrect
SDN Programming Languages Many programming languages have been proposed abstractions to pro-
gram SDNs, e.g., Frenetic [45], Pyretic [78] and Maple [97]. These allow programmers to compose complex
rules without the need to manually resolve conflicts between rules. However, these languages face limitations
implementing general policies that deliver higher-level intent, such as expressing middleware functionality
or QoS constraints.
SDN Synthesis Platforms Network state can also be synthesized from a set of pre-specified correctness
conditions. NetGen [90], for example, takes as input a specification using regular expressions to define path
changes and a set of equivalence classes to modify. It uses an SMT solver to find the minimal number of
changes. However, similar to Merlin [91] and FatTire [89], this tool is designed to be used as a compiler,
with performance that is less applicable for real-time applications (i.e., minute-scale synthesis). While using
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NetGen in place of our ILP is possible, doing so would additionally require translating each update into
an equivalent NetGen specification. Similarly, Marham [52] proposes a framework for automated repair,
but with slower performance — on the order of several seconds for topologies with tens of nodes and links.
Margrave [80] analyzes changes to access control policy changes, highlighting to an operator the effect it has




In this thesis, we discuss three primitives to help discover unpredictable behaviors in software-defined
networks. However, these techniques are useful to other domains where a collection of devices are cen-
trally controlled by applications, such as home automation (HA) or Internet-of-Things (IoT). In particular,
searching for unpredictable behavior in a general control system can be applied to three similar challenges:
composing the applications controlling the devices, verifying that each application is free of software bugs,
and ensuring the output from the controller (i.e., the commands send to the devices) are correct.
In Chapter 2, we describe a model of control modules as a collection of event handlers that we believe
applies to other domains. Furthermore, the focus on faithfully modeling time during program exploration
is applicable to other domains whose applications depend on the relative and absolute time of events, such
as IoT. Although extending DeLorean to another domain would require implementing a new model of the
controller and devices, the exploration of application behavior would remain unchanged.
However, extending Ravel and NEAt to other domains presents additional challenges. Even though the
underlying primitive implemented in these tools are applicable to other systems, they both build on the graph
structure of networks. For example, Ravel abstracts a network into a set of tables that models application
demands and data plane state as a graph. Similarly, correctness policies in NEAt are expressed as graphs.
One direction for future work is to explore how to model other domains with this graph abstraction, as well
as other abstractions that can be used with these tools.
In addition, these techniques may have applications to other properties beyond correctness and pre-
dictability. DeLorean, for example, could be used to check performance or security [28]. Consider scenarios
where the firing or ordering of timers directly impacts performance (e.g., convergence of a distributed pro-
tocol). By systematically exploring future program states, DeLorean could report best case or worst case
times.
Similarly, NEAt’s transparent modification of updates could also address performance. NEAt could act
as an optimization layer, transforming updates to meet switch memory constraints, balance traffic across
links, or minimize path length. Effectively transforming updates to meet such diverse demands, however,
introduces additional challenges. In particular, modifications to updates — whether to repair or optimize
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a change to the data plane state — should preserve the intention of the update. In future work, we could
explore this in two directions: analysis of applications and analysis of network changes. For the former
approach, we could build on program analysis to extract invariants from programs. For the latter, we could
mine properties and invariants about the network as it changes. Using these invariants, we could inform
our search for repairs or modifications to updates. In the context of orchestration, we could additionally
leverage these mined properties to resolve conflicts between applications that are codependent.
Additionally, we believe NEAt could have additional applications beyond repair, such as a security
substrate to quickly and temporarily enforce updated security policies. For example, an operator could use




This thesis explores techniques in verification and synthesis to ease the burden of configuring and con-
trolling a software-defined network. In configuring an SDN, an operator must consider the behavior at the
management plane, control plane, and data plane. At the management plane, an operator must reason
about the interaction and conflicts between the applications controlling the network. At the control plane,
she must reason about each individual application’s execution to ensure it is free of software bugs. Finally,
she must understand the implementation of the controller, to prevent unexpected behavior arising from the
intricacies of the controller’s implementation and processing of updates.
To this end, this thesis builds on verification and synthesis to propose three new primitives to help op-
erators automatically search for unpredictable behavior in the applications controlling an SDN. Specifically,
we design primitives for fast-forwarding, orchestration, and autocorrection. First, we build on verification to
detect bugs in applications dependent on time. We develop a model checker, DeLorean, that systematically
explores the behavior of home automation and SDN applications. With new techniques for speeding up this
exploration, DeLorean can explore the future of behavior of these programs faster than they occur and, in
essence, fast-forward a program.
Next, we build on synthesis techniques to reduce the complexity of composing together multiple appli-
cations. In automating the search for dependencies between applications, we design Ravel. Ravel adopts a
relational representation of the network and uses a standard PostgreSQL database at its core. This enables
ad-hoc creation of new programming abstractions and logic-based reasoning of inter-application dependen-
cies.
Finally, to prevent multiple applications and their interaction from installing policy-violating updates,
we introduce an autocorrection primitive with NEAt. NEAt allows backward-compatibility with existing
SDN deployments and acts as a transparent layer between the network and controller, enforcing correctness
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